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FACING THE FACTS: AN EMPIRICAL STUDY
OF THE FAIRNESS AND EFFICIENCY OF
FORECLOSURES AND A PROPOSAL FOR REFORM
Debra Pogrund Stark*
Lenders view real estate foreclosures as too expensive and time
consuming a process which needlessly increases the costs of mak-
ing loans. Others complain that the foreclosure process fails to
adequately protect the borrower's equity (the value of the property
in excess of the debt secured by the property) in the mortgaged
property.
This article tests these views by gathering new data on the
fairness and efficiency of the foreclosure process. Based on the
data collected (which confirms some assumptions but disproves
others), the author proposes a reform of the foreclosure process to
promote the interest of both lenders and borrowers. Under the
proposal, the foreclosure process should take less time and cost
less money, yet provide borrowers with a more meaningful oppor-
tunity to prevent the forfeiture of their equity in the mortgaged
property. The author recommends that Congress consider the data
from this study and enact this reform proposal in place of the
current draft legislation-legislation which would unnecessarily
sacrifice the interests of defaulting borrowers in order to achieve
a faster and cheaper foreclosure process.
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1982, Brandeis University; J.D. 1985, Northwestern University School of Law. The
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INTRODUCTION
Are the real property foreclosure laws in the United States
fair to borrowers who default under their mortgage loans, or
do they sacrifice the borrower's equity' in the mortgaged
property to protect the interests of lenders? Can the foreclo-
sure process be reformed to treat defaulting borrowers more
fairly while increasing efficiency for recovering lenders?
Although many have written critically about the real prop-
erty foreclosure process,2 few have accumulated and analyzed
hard data on the process.' Even those empirical studies do not
contain key data needed to answer two basic questions: 1) Is
the foreclosure process fair and efficient? and 2) Can the
1. As used in this Article, "equity" in property is the extent to which the fair
market value of the property exceeds the amount of debt secured by the property.
Thus, if there is outstanding debt of $100,000 on a property worth $90,000, the
borrower has no "equity" in the property. Conversely, if the amount of the outstand-
ing debt is $90,000 and the fair market value of the property is $100,000, then the
borrower has $10,000 of equity in the property. See infra Part III.C for a discussion
of the carrying costs and resale costs in a typical resale after a foreclosure. These
costs should be included when calculating the borrower's true equity in the mort-
gaged property. See infra Part III.C.
2. See, e.g., 1 GRANT S. NELSON & DALE A. WHITMAN, REAL ESTATE FINANCE
LAw §§ 7-8 (3d ed. 1993); Rex E. Madsen, Equitable Considerations of Mortgage
Foreclosure and Redemption in Utah: A Need for Remedial Legislation, 1976 UTAH
L. REV. 327, 348-56 (proposing alternative approaches to the foreclosure process in
Utah); Grant S. Nelson, Deficiency Judgments After Real Estate Foreclosures in
Missouri: Some Modest Proposals, 47 MO. L. REV. 151, 160-70 (1982) (suggesting a
new standard by which foreclosure deficiency judgment claims could be tested);
Robert M. Washburn, The Judicial and Legislative Response to Price Inadequacy in
Mortgage Foreclosure Sales, 53 S. CAL. L. REV. 843, 844-55 (1980) (surveying defects
in the foreclosure and sale process).
3. See, e.g., Robert J. Aalberts & Douglas S. Bible, Mortgage Default in
Louisiana: An Empirical Study of Recent Foreclosures on Residential Property in
Caddo Parish, 15 S.U. L. REV. 215 (1988) (analyzing all foreclosure suits filed in a
Louisiana parish during a seven month period in 1986); Patrick B. Bauer, Judicial
Foreclosure and Statutory Redemption: The Soundness of Iowa's Traditional Prefer-
ence for Protection Over Credit, 71 IowA L. REV. 1 (1985) (analyzing Iowa's system of
judicial foreclosure and statutory redemption); Patrick B. Bauer, Statutory Redemp-
tion Reconsidered: The Operation of Iowa's Redemption Statute in Two Counties
Between 1881-1980, 70 IowA L. REV. 343 (1985) (analyzing the operation of Iowa's
redemption statute); Homer F. Carey et al., Studies in Foreclosures in Cook County:
Illinois Foreclosure Methods and Redemption, 27 ILL. L. REV. 595 (1933) (analyzing
foreclosures in Cook County, Illinois, and concluding that the use ofjudicial foreclo-
sure alone is inefficient); Steven Wechsler, Through the Looking Glass: Foreclosure
by Sale as De Facto Strict Foreclosure-An Empirical Study of Mortgage Foreclosure
and Subsequent Resale, 70 CORNELL L. REV. 850 (1985) (analyzing 118 foreclosure
sales in Onondaga County, New York, in 1979).
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foreclosure process be improved to better protect the interests
of lenders and borrowers?4
The purpose of this empirical study is to answer those two
basic questions. As Justice Holmes stated in response to
theories regarding the operation and reform of the law, "the
first step toward improvement is to look the facts in the
face."5 This Article attempts to look at the facts of the foreclo-
sure process and proposes a reform based on an examination
of how foreclosures really operate.
The fairness and efficiency of the foreclosure process is an
important issue because foreclosure directly and indirectly
affects a large segment of the American population. As of
1995, more than three trillion dollars were invested in resi-
dential real estate6 in the United States.7 The foreclosure rate
for national outstanding residential mortgage loans was
approximately one percent at the beginning of the fourth
quarter of 1996.8 Borrowers as well as lenders have an inter-
est in an efficient foreclosure process because lenders will
pass along the costs associated with delinquent mortgages to
new borrowers in the form of higher loan fees or higher
interest rates.
Part I briefly summarizes the basic processes and proce-
dures for real estate foreclosures in the fifty states, noting the
primary similarities and differences among the states' foreclo-
sure laws. Because the empirical study in this Article relies
on data from real estate foreclosures in Illinois, 9 Part I next
describes the foreclosure process in that state. Finally, Part I
4. See discussion infra Part III.C for details on the additional data gathered in
this study, such as the percentage of cases that are dismissed prior to judicial sale,
and the average carrying costs and resale costs. These costs help to determine the
true profit or loss when mortgaged property is resold after a foreclosure.
5. Oliver Wendell Holmes, Introduction to RATIONAL BASIS OF LEGAL INSTITUTIONS
xxix, xxxii (Ass'n of Am. Law Sch. ed., 1923).
6. As used herein, "residential" describes dwelling units ranging from single
family dwellings to six-unit apartment buildings.
7. See Profits and Balance Sheet Developments at US. Commercial Banks in
1995, 82 FED. RES. BULL. 483, app. at A35, table 1.54 (June 1996).
8. See Delinquencies on the Rise at Yearend, THE MORTGAGE MARKETPLACE, Mar.
10, 1997, available in 1997 WL 7938104.
9. The source of the data for this empirical study was the foreclosure com-
plaints filed in the Chancery Court in Cook County, Illinois, in July 1993 and July
1994. See infra note 85 and accompanying text for an explanation of how these
months were selected. Illinois was chosen as the state from which to collect data for
three reasons: (i) the Illinois foreclosure process is similar to many other jurisdic-
tions; (ii) the Illinois statute provides special elective reforms; and (iii) the author
had easier access to data in Illinois.
SUMMER 1997]
University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform [VOL. 30:4
summarizes the criticisms that the foreclosure process is
unfair and inefficient, and notes the special reform features of
the Illinois foreclosure laws enacted in 1987.10
Part II describes the types of data collected in the study, the
methods of data collection, and the differences between the
data collected in this study and the data in other studies of
foreclosures.
Part III presents and analyzes the results of the empirical
study. By "looking the facts in the face," the Article assesses
the efficiency and fairness of foreclosure in Illinois (which is
similar in its foreclosure process to many other jurisdictions)
and determines whether the foreclosure process can be re-
formed to promote the interests of both borrowers and
lenders.
Part IV proposes a reform to the foreclosure process for
residential mortgages in Illinois and in all of the states by
bifurcating the foreclosure system in order to further the
goals of both borrowers and lenders. Then Part IV compares
this proposed reform with other reform proposals. The Article
suggests that bifurcating the foreclosure process will reduce
the costs associated with foreclosures while protecting the
borrower's equity in the property. The normative basis for this
proposal is the belief that the foreclosure process should
operate as efficiently as possible and in a manner that will
provide the defaulting borrower with a realistic opportunity to
prevent a forfeiture of his or her equity in the mortgaged
property.
After analyzing the empirical data contained both in this
study and in prior studies, this Article concludes that the
foreclosure process can be made fairer and more efficient
through a bifurcated foreclosure process which would promote
the interests of both borrowers and lenders and would best
accomplish this transformation.
10. Numerous reforms were enacted in 1987 to the real estate foreclosure
process to attract more third party bidders to foreclosure sales and to increase the
amount bid at each sale. See discussion infra Part I.D.
642
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I. REAL ESTATE FORECLOSURE LAW AND PROCEDURES
A. Summary of Typical Foreclosure Procedures
in the United States
A real estate mortgage is a pledge of the mortgagor's inter-
est in the real estate described in the mortgage document."
The pledge secures a specified debt.'2 When a mortgagor
defaults in the payment of the debt or the performance of any
other obligations which the mortgagor has agreed to perform,
an acceleration clause usually causes the entire indebtedness
to become immediately due and payable. Theoretically, a
lender and borrower could agree that upon default and accel-
eration, the lender would become the fee title holder of the
property pledged. English courts of equity, however, developed
the concept of an equitable right of redemption to ameliorate
the possible harsh consequences of default and acceleration
clauses. Under the equitable right of redemption, a borrower
has a certain amount of time to pay off the debt and redeem
the property, notwithstanding any agreement to the contrary
between the borrower and the lender. 3 The lender can cut off
this equitable right of redemption through the foreclosure
process governed by state statute in each state.
14
While each state has its own peculiar foreclosure laws and
procedures, certain basic features are present in each statu-
tory scheme. Two dominant forms of foreclosure laws exist in
America: a judicial foreclosure sale and a non-judicial foreclo-
sure sale (known as a power of sale).' 5 In a judicial sale, the
lender must bring a court action to foreclose the borrower's
equitable right to redeem the mortgaged property. 6 In a
power of sale, the lender (or trustee under a deed of trust)
11. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1010 (6th ed. 1990). This pledge is usually of
an ownership interest, but it can also be of a leasehold interest. See id. at 1011.
12. See id. at 1153. This specified debt is usually a debt of the mortgagor to the
mortgagee.
13. See id. at 541.
14. See generally FORECLOSURE LAW & RELATED REMEDIES: A STATE-BY-STATE
DIGEST (Sidney A. Keyles ed., 1995) [hereinafter STATE-BY-STATE DIGEST] (summa-
rizing the foreclosure laws and processes in every state).
15. See generally id.
16. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 849 (6th ed. 1990).
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may foreclose the borrower's equitable right to redeem the
mortgaged property .without bringing a court action.
17
The following constitutes the typical process followed in a
jurisdiction requiring a judicial foreclosure sale:' 8
(i) the mortgagee, or lender, files a foreclosure complaint
and serves the mortgagor, or borrower, and any other
parties required by statute; 9
(ii) the lender files a lis pendens against the property;
20
(iii) there is a court hearing and court judgment of foreclo-
sure;
2
(iv) the lender sends notice of the sale to the borrower and
any other parties required by the statute, and advertises
the public sale for a certain period of time prior to the sale
and in the manner specified in the statute;
(v) the foreclosure sale of the mortgaged property occurs
(conducted by the sheriff or other authorized party) in
accordance with statutory requirements;
(vi) the successful bidder, receives a certificate of sale;
(vii) the court issues an order confirming the sale and
after any applicable statutory redemption rights expire, a
deed of sale is issued to the successful bidder;
(viii) the borrower relinquishes possession of the property
a certain period of time after the court order confirming
17. See id. at 1172.
18. The following explanation of the foreclosure process is detailed in STATE-BY-
STATE DIGEST, supra note 14. For an example of a particular state that has incorporat-
ed some of these features into its statute, see id. at 145-48 (discussing Idaho
foreclosure statutes).
19. Some jurisdictions statutorily require a written notice of default and
acceleration of the loan before filing. For examples of such jurisdictions, see STATE-
BY-STATE DIGEST, supra note 14, at 63 (Colorado), 128 (Georgia), and 167 (Indiana).
20. A lis pendens is a notice of the pending foreclosure litigation that is filed or
recorded in the official property records kept by the county where the property is
located. See BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 932 (6th ed. 1990).
21. For income-producing properties, lenders commonly seek the appointment of
a receiver to handle the revenue and expenses from the property during the penden-
cy of the case.
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the sale (in jurisdictions which grant a statutory redemp-
tion period after the foreclosure sale, the borrower may
sometimes remain in possession after the sale until the
expiration of the statutory redemption period); and
(ix) if the amount bid is less than the final judgment, the
lender sometimes seeks a deficiency judgment against the
borrower following confirmation of the judicial sale (if the
jurisdiction's laws do not prohibit or limit a suit for a
deficiency through one-action rules, fair value limitations
or other anti-deficiency laws).22
As previously mentioned, a borrower enjoys an equitable
right to redeem the property prior to a foreclosure sale of the
property, until such period is extinguished by the foreclosure
process. State statutes also provide for a specified period
which must expire before the foreclosure sale can occur (this
period is referred to as the statutory right of redemption).2"
While some statutes permit a waiver of the statutory right of
redemption in certain circumstances,24 a borrower cannot
waive the equitable right of redemption when the loan is first
made.25 Many state statutes also provide a time for the bor-
rower to exercise the right of reinstatement between the filing
and the foreclosure sale.2"
The following is the typical process followed in a jurisdiction
permitting a non-judicial foreclosure sale:27
(i) the lender or trustee records a notice of default and
sends notice of the default and acceleration of the debt to
22. A one-action rule requires the lender to elect either to foreclose on the
mortgage or to sue the guarantor or maker of the note, satisfying any judgment on
the note with their assets. A fair value limitation requires the calculation of the
deficiency amount by comparing the fair value of the mortgaged property against the
final judgment amount instead of comparing the amount bid at the foreclosure sale
against the final judgment amount. Another anti-deficiency law is an absolute
prohibition from suing borrowers for the difference between the amount bid at a
foreclosure sale and the final judgment amount. This prohibition can apply to either
an acquisition seller-financed with a purchase money mortgage or a power of sale.
23. See, e.g., N.Y. REAL PROP. ACTS. LAW § 1341 (McKinney 1979).
24. See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-2414(a) (Supp. 1992).
25. See Russo v. Wolbers, 323 N.W.2d 385, 389-90 (Mich. Ct. App. 1982);
MacArthur v. North Palm Beach Utilities, Inc., 187 So. 2d 681 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1966), rev'd on other grounds, 202 So. 2d 181 (Fla. 1967).
26. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 2924c(a)(1) (West 1997); 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/15-1602
(West 1994).
27. The following explanation of a non-judicial foreclosure sale is detailed in
STATE-BY-STATE DIGEST, supra note 14.
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the borrower and any other party required under the
applicable statute;
(ii) if the borrower or other party fails to cure the default
within the specified statutory period after the notice of
default, the lender or trustee sends out a notice of sale
within the specified period of time before the date of the
sale and advertises the sale;
(iii) the foreclosure sale occurs unless the borrower re-
deems or reinstates the loan.28
Usually a borrower is not entitled to any post-sale redemp-
tion rights in a non-judicial sale29 and often the lender is not
entitled to seek a deficiency action against the mortgagor in a
non-judicial sale.30
From the lender's perspective, the non-judicial sale is pref-
erable to the judicial sale because the non-judicial sale is
quicker and less expensive.3 1 The lender's ability to recover the
collateral more quickly saves the lender the costs associated
with the time value of money and also may reduce the costs of
restoring the property because deterioration occurs for only a
short time. From the lender's perspective, the only negative
aspects of a non-judicial sale are the usual inability to obtain
a deficiency judgment and the greater uncertainty-due to the
court's lack of involvement-that the foreclosure action is
valid.
28. Most non-judicial sales are conducted by a trustee under a power of sale.
The statutes authorizing this manner of sale do not specify as many details regulat-
ing the sale as the statutes requiring a judicial sale. The trustee has more discretion
but also has a fiduciary duty to hold the sale in a manner which will yield the
highest price possible. See Debra P. Stark, The Emperor Still Has Clothes: Fraudu-
lent Conveyance Challenges After the BFP Decision, 47 S.C. L. REV. 563, 594-95
(1996).
29. See ALASKA STAT. § 34.20.090(a) (Michie 1996); NEV. REV. STAT. § 107.080(5)
(1995). See generally STATE-BY-STATE DIGEST, supra note 14.
30. See ALASKA STAT. § 34.20.100 (Michie 1996); IDAHO CODE § 6-101 (Supp.
1996); MIcH. COMP. LAWS § 600.3105(1)-(2) (1987). See generally STATE-BY-STATE
DIGEST, supra note 14.
31. Although it is difficult to generalize the timing in different jurisdictions, a
power of sale can typically be accomplished in as little as two to four months
compared with a typical minimum of six to twelve months for finalizing a judicial
sale. See generally STATE-BY-STATE DIGEST, supra note 14 (assessing typical time
frames and costs in both judicial and non-judicial foreclosures in each state).
646
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From the borrower's perspective, the judicial sale is prefera-
ble. First, since it generally takes longer to perform a judicial
sale than a power of sale,32 the borrower has more time to
reinstate or redeem the property. Second, the borrower can
further delay the foreclosure or have the action dismissed by
raising defenses.33
In only three jurisdictions (Connecticut, Illinois, and Ver-
mont) can a lender, under certain limited circumstances,
recover on the mortgaged property through what is known as
a "strict foreclosure."34 In a strict foreclosure, the lender
brings a court action to foreclose on the property and gains
full title by decree of the court rather than through bidding at
a foreclosure. This is unlike a power of sale, which involves a
foreclosure sale without court involvement, or a judicial fore-
closure, in which the court is involved both before and after
the foreclosure sale.35 No public or private foreclosure sale of
the property occurs in strict foreclosure." In all three of the
strict foreclosure jurisdictions, the borrower has a period of
time to redeem the property after the court's judgment and
decree naming the lender as the owner of the property.37
Connecticut and Vermont permit strict foreclosures if it
appears that the property is worth less than the debt
claimed.3" In both states, the lender can sue the borrower for
a deficiency even after using a strict foreclosure. 9 The defi-
ciency judgment is based on the difference between the
amount of debt and the appraised value of the property.40
In Illinois, a lender can seek a strict foreclosure if he can
show that the borrower is insolvent and the amount of the
debt is greater than the value of the mortgaged property.4'
32. See id.
33. See id.
34. See PAUL GOLDSTEIN & GERALD KORNGOLD, REAL ESTATE TRANSACTIONS 470-71 (3d
ed. 1993) (referencing CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 49-15 (West 1994); 735 ILL. COMP.
STAT. 5/15-1403 (West 1994); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 4531 (Supp. 1996)).
35. See id.
36. See id.
37. See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 49-20 (West 1994); 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/15-
1603 (West 1995); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 4531 (Supp. 1996).
38. See GOLDSTEIN & KORNGOLD, supra note 34, at 470. A foreclosure by sale may,
however, be ordered if the mortgage authorizes it and if the plaintiff or defendant
requests it. See NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 2, § 7.10, at 576-77.
39. See GOLDSTEIN & KORNGOLD, supra note 34, at 470.
40. See id.
41. See Great Lakes Mortgage Corp. v. Collymore, 302 N.E.2d 248 (Ill. App. Ct.
1973).
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But unlike Connecticut and Vermont, the lender has no right
to a deficiency judgment after a strict foreclosure. 42 The pro-
cess of strict foreclosure in Illinois is rarely utilized,43 perhaps
because of the insolvency requirement and because the Illinois
statute offers no guidelines on how to accomplish a strict
foreclosure .
B. Basic Features of Illinois Foreclosure Law
Illinois law requires a judicial sale and does not permit a
power of sale.45 In residential mortgages, the Illinois statute
provides for a redemption period for the greater of either
seven months from the date the court acquires jurisdiction
over all mortgagors or three months after the judgment of
foreclosure.46 In non-residential mortgages, the redemption
period runs for the greater of either six months from the date
the court acquires jurisdiction over all mortgagors or three
months after the judgment of foreclosure. 47 A mortgagor in a
commercial mortgage may waive the statutory right of re-
demption at the time the mortgage is made,4" but a mortgagor
under a residential mortgage may not.49 A residential mort-
gagor may waive the right to redemption or reinstatement
after a foreclosure action is commenced, but only if the lender
waives the right to a deficiency judgment.50 A "residential
mortgage" includes mortgages on residential property contain-
ing six or fewer dwelling units, at least one unit of which is
occupied by the mortgagor or the spouse of the mortgagor as
his or her principal place of residence.5 ' A "residential mort-
gage" does not include a single tract of agricultural real estate
42. See id. at 250.
43. None of the 161 sales from the July 1993 Illinois foreclosure cases nor the
115 sales from the July 1994 Illinois foreclosure cases examined in this study
involved a strict foreclosure. See infra app. A, I 5(f).
44. See 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/15-1403 (West 1994) (stating simply that mortgag-
ees may utilize strict foreclosure as a means of foreclosing mortgages).
45. See 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/15-1404 to -1405 (West 1994).
46. See id. 5/15-1603(b)(1).
47. See id. 5/15-1603(b)(2).
48. See id. 5/15-1601(b).
49. See id. 5/15-1601(a).
50. See id. 5/15-1601(c).
51. See id. 5/15-1219.
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larger than forty acres.52 The mortgagor may exercise the
right of redemption, but other interested persons or entities
(such as a junior lienholder) ordinarily may not. 3 The mort-
gagor also enjoys a right of reinstatement, which is the right
to cure the default and reinstate the loan by paying only the
amount in default plus costs, rather than paying the entire
accelerated loan amount.54 The right of reinstatement arises
upon the filing of the foreclosure action and must be exercised
before the earlier of either the entry of the judgment of fore-
closure or ninety days after the mortgagor is served.55
If the mortgagor fails to redeem or reinstate the loan, a
judicial sale occurs following advertising and notice of the
sale.5" It is customary to require the bidding party to deposit
10% of the bid price when making the bid and to require the
payment of the balance of the bid within forty-eight hours.57
If the amount of the successful bid at the sale is less than the
final judgment amount, the lender can sue for a deficiency;
the statute does not prohibit pursuing a deficiency and does
not contain a one-action rule or a fair value limitation. 8
A court must confirm the sale before the lender may sue for
a deficiency.59 The court is required to confirm a sale unless
proper notices were not given, the terms of the sale were
unconscionable, the sale was conducted fraudulently, or jus-
tice was not otherwise served. 0 In addition to these statutory
grounds for invalidating a foreclosure sale, the case law im-
plies that a court may set aside a foreclosure sale if there was
both a grossly inadequate bid and a noncompliance with the
52. See id.
53. See id. 5/15-1402(b), -1603. Under § 1603, only the "owner of redemption,"
defined in the statute as the mortgagor or other owner, see id. 5/15-1212, may
exercise the right of redemption, unless the foreclosure is a consent foreclosure. See
id. 5/15-1603. If the foreclosure is a consent foreclosure, a party other than the
mortgagor who has an interest in the real estate and who objects to the consent
foreclosure may exercise the right of redemption under § 1402 of the statute. See id.
5/15-1402(b).
54. See 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/15-1602 (West 1994).
55. See id. The borrower can exercise a right of reinstatement only once every
five years. See id.
56. See id. 5/15-1507.
57. See Jeffrey Liss, Notices of Foreclosure Sales Under the New Law, in
MORTGAGE FORECLOSURES IN ILLINOIS 1-25, 1-28 (Ill. Inst. for Continuing Legal Educ.
ed., 1988) (reprinted from CHI. DAILY L. BULL., Oct. 8, 1987).
58. See 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/15-1504(f), -1511 (West 1994). See generally supra
note 22 (describing the one-action rule and fair value limitation).
59. See id. 5/15-1508(e).
60. See id. 5/15-1508(b).
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foreclosure process. 61 A residential real estate mortgagor has
a thirty-day redemption period after the foreclosure sale if the
lender elects to sue her for a deficiency.62 The mortgagor also
may be entitled to possession of the home until thirty days
after the confirmation of the sale.63 The mortgagee of residen-
tial real estate can seek possession prior to this date if she
can satisfy certain requirements.64
Due to redemption periods and court calendar delays, Illi-
nois's foreclosure process usually takes nine months to com-
plete even when the mortgagor does not raise any defenses.
If there are no court delays, no defenses are raised, and
redemption periods are waived, ninety days is the earliest the
process can be completed because of the time allowed to
answer the complaint (thirty days from the service of sum-
mons) and the publication requirements prior to the sale.6
C. Criticisms of the Foreclosure Process
The foreclosure process in the United States is criticized
primarily on two grounds: unfairness and inefficiency. These
two criticisms are based on the assumption that third parties
rarely bid at a foreclosure sale. Critics argue that, as a result,
the lender himself is able to buy the property at a price far
below the fair market value, resell the property at a profit,
and then recover more than the original debt by suing the
borrower for the difference between the amount bid and the
final judgment amount (the deficiency).6 If the foreclosure
61. See Strauss v. Anderson, 9 N.E.2d 205 (Ill. 1937); Levy v. Broadway-Carmen
Bldg. Corp., 8 N.E.2d 671 (Ill. 1937); Lyons Say. and Loan Ass'n v. Gash Assocs., 545
N.E.2d 412 (Ill. App. Ct. 1989). See generally Stark, supra note 28, at 583-98
(discussing fraudulent conveyance challenges in different states).
62. See 735 ILL. CoMP. STAT. 5/15-1604 (West 1994).
63. See id. 5/15-1701. The mortgagee must object during the foreclosure and
show good cause to be entitled to possession. See id. 5/15-1701(b). The mortgagee
must be entitled to possession according to the loan documents, and the court must
be "satisfied that there is a reasonable probability that the mortgagee will prevail on
a final hearing of the cause." Id.
64. See id. 5/15-1701(b).
65. See infra app. B, fig. 15.
66. See STATE-BY-STATE DIGEST, supra note 14, at 155; see also 735 ILL. CoMP. STAT.
5/15-1507(c) (West 1994) (requiring publication of notice in at least three publica-
tions, once a week for three consecutive weeks "not less than 7 days prior to the
sale").
67. See, e.g., Wechsler, supra note 3, at 853.
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system routinely operated this way, the system would clearly
be unfair to borrowers. If third parties rarely bid at foreclo-
sure sales and the lender usually bought the property, then
the foreclosure sale process also would be inefficient; if the
lender both initiates the foreclosure process and ends the
process with ownership, then the sale process is redundant,
costly and time-consuming, with no corresponding gains to
borrowers. As previously mentioned, one of the key purposes
of this study is to test whether these criticisms are well-
founded.6"
It is not difficult to speculate why third parties might rarely
bid at or close to the fair market value of the property at a
foreclosure sale. First, typical home purchasers may not know
that the property is for sale because no signs are posted on
the property and the sale is advertised in the legal section of
the newspaper, rather than in the real estate section.69 Sec-
ond, the bidder does not have an opportunity to inspect the
property before bidding. Third, at the sale the bidder custom-
arily is required to pay 10% of the bid price immediately and
the balance in forty-eight hours.70 Finally, in a number of
jurisdictions, the mortgagor can redeem the property within
six months or more after the foreclosure sale. 7' These stan-
dard features of a foreclosure sale may drive the typical home
purchaser out of the market. The third parties who attend
and bid at a foreclosure sale tend to be experienced real estate
investors who are either highly liquid or enjoy a line of credit
that enables them to bid at the foreclosure sale and pay off
the balance within forty-eight hours. These investors, com-
monly referred to as "scavengers," are aware that they are
taking risks when purchasing property in this manner.72
68. See infra notes 172-72 and accompanying text (finding that lenders reaped
large profits through resale in only 6% of Cook County's 1993 judicial sales and 7%
of 1994 sales).
69. The Illinois Mortgage Foreclosure Act was modified in 1987 to require
publication in both the legal section and the real estate sales section of a newspaper.
735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/15-1507(c)(2) (West 1994).
70. See Liss, supra note 57, at 1-28. Financing the balance payment with a
conventional loan is almost impossible in this scenario because a lender may take
weeks conducting a credit check and an appraisal of the property.
71. See STATE-BY-STATE-DIGEST, supra note 14, at 25 (Arkansas), 44 (California),
184, 187 (Kansas).
72. Purchasing property at a foreclosure sale is a risky prospect, since one is
unable to inspect the property prior to bidding and there are no warranties on the
physical condition of the property.
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Consequently, they only bid when they think they are bidding
much less than the fair market value of the property.
One commentator has criticized the foreclosure process in
which a lender or a third party is able to bid any amount less
than the fair market value of the property. v3 According to him,
the amount bid should either reflect the fair market value, or,
if the amount bid is lower than the fair market value, the
borrower should recapture any gain made upon a resale
within a short period of time after the foreclosure sale. 4
A "fair" foreclosure process, however, does not require a
process in which the defaulting borrower's interest is consid-
ered to the exclusion of the interests of the lender. To the
extent that the lender is not made whole through the
foreclosure process, the lender will transfer those costs to all
borrowers in the form of higher fees or interest rates.
Consequently, lenders and borrowers share an interest in
keeping the costs of the foreclosure process as low as possible.
A "fair" foreclosure system attempts to balance the interest of
lenders and the interest of borrowers who default by
maintaining efficiency while providing borrowers with a true
opportunity to protect their equity in the property.
D. Special Features of Illinois Law
Illinois foreclosure law was modified in 1987 to address
some of these problems.75 The general purpose of the modifica-
tions was to attract third parties, thereby generating bids
which better approximate the mortgaged property's fair mar-
ket value. 6 Two key modifications include the expiration of
the redemption period before the foreclosure sale rather than
after the sale, and the requirement to advertise the sale in
both the legal notices and real estate sections of a newspa-
per.77 In addition, the Illinois Mortgage Foreclosure Act
provides for fourteen "special matters" or provisions. The
special matters were intended to make the sale process more
73. See Wechsler, supra note 3, at 885-86.
74. See id. at 884.
75. See generally 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/11 (West 1994) (showing an effective
date of July 1, 1987).
76. See Liss, supra note 57, at 1-25.
77. See 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/15-1507(b) & (c)(2) (West 1994).
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commercially reasonable, resulting in more third party
bidding and higher bids. 78 The special matters do not
automatically apply; the parties must request them in the
complaint or by separate motion. The following are the special
matters which may be sought:
(1) a manner of sale other than public auction;
(2) a sale by sealed bid;
(3) an official or other person who shall be the officer to
conduct the sale other than the one customarily designated
by the court;
(4) provisions for non-exclusive broker listings or designat-
ing a duly licensed real estate broker nominated by one of
the parties to exclusively list the real estate for sale;
(5) the fees or commissions to be paid out of the sale pro-
ceeds to the listing or other duly licensed broker, if any,
who shall have procured the accepted bid;
(6) the fees to be paid out of the sale proceeds to an auc-
tioneer, if any, who shall have been authorized to conduct
a public auction sale;
(7) whether and in what manner and with what content
signs shall be posted on the real estate;
(8) a particular time and place at which such bids shall be
received;
(9) a particular newspaper or newspapers in which notice
of sale shall be published;
(10) the format for the advertising of such sale, including
the size, content and format of such advertising, and
additional advertising of such sale;
(11) matters or exceptions to which title in the real estate
may be subject at the sale;
(12) a requirement that title insurance in a specified form
be provided to a purchaser at the sale, and who shall pay
for such insurance;
(13) whether and to what extent bids with mortgage or
other contingencies will be allowed;
(14) such other matters as approved by the court to ensure
sale of the real estate for the most commercially favorable
price for the type of real estate involved.7 9
78. Id. 5/15-1506(f); see Liss, supra note 57, at 1-25.
79. 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/15-1506(f) (West 1994).
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In addition,
If all of the parties agree in writing on the minimum
price and that the real estate may be sold to the first
person who offers in writing to purchase the real estate
for such price, and on such other commercially reasonable
terms and conditions as the parties may agree, then the
court shall order the real estate to be sold on such terms,
subject to confirmation of the sale .... '8
Theoretically, if the parties sought to incorporate some of
these special matters into the judgment, the foreclosure sale
price would be closer to the fair market value of the property
than the price received in a usual foreclosure sale. Special
matters were designed to attract average home purchasers to
purchase the property.
The special matters added to the Illinois Act were an at-
tempt to make the foreclosure sales process more comparable
to a voluntary sale. 81 Under the Act, a broker can be hired to
market and advertise the sale in the conventional manner.
Thus, a third party can inspect the property, receive title
insurance on the property, and bid on the condition that she
receive a loan commitment to finance the purchase of the
property.
The proponents of the reform hoped that either the mort-
gagor or the mortgagee would use the special matters to
maximize the level of bidding at the foreclosure sale.82 As
previously mentioned, this empirical study collected data on
whether the mortgagors and mortgagees used the special
matters and the impact, if any, that such utilization had on
bidding.
II. THE EMPIRICAL STUDY: DATA COLLECTED
AND METHODOLOGY
A. Data Collected for This Study
To assess the fairness of the foreclosure process and the
extent to which borrowers are able to preserve their equity
80. Id. 5/15-1506(g).
81. See Liss, supra note 57, at 1-28.
82. See id. at 1-25.
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under the process, data from Illinois foreclosures was collected
(the Illinois foreclosure process is similar to many other
jurisdictions). The data focused on answering the following
questions:
(i) In what percentage of the cases in which a foreclosure
complaint has been filed are the cases dismissed (i.e., no
judicial foreclosure) and on what basis are these cases
dismissed? Did the borrower exercise the right of rein-
statement or the right of redemption, or did the borrower
file a bankruptcy action or settle with the lender? In
addition, when during the foreclosure process do borrow-
ers typically exercise their rights to reinstatement and
redemption, or instead file for bankruptcy?
(ii) In what percentage of foreclosure sales does a third
party or the lender bid at the sale and then resell the
property within a year at a profit? In what percentage of
the cases does the lender bid less than the final judgment
amount and then seek the deficiency from the borrower's
other assets? In what percentage of the cases does the
lender sue the borrower for a deficiency and resell the
property for a profit?
(iii) How soon after the loan is made does the borrower
default (to ascertain in a general, although imprecise
fashion, the amount of equity that the borrower has in-
vested in the property) and how often does the borrower
raise defenses to the foreclosure complaint?
To assess the efficiency of the foreclosure process, data was
collected to answer the following questions:
(i) What are the costs associated with the foreclosure
process as a percentage of the amount originally loaned,
as a percentage of the amount due at the time the foreclo-
sure action was commenced, and as a percentage of the
final judgment amount?
(ii) What are the components of the costs (interest, ad-
vances to cure defaults, court costs, attorney's fees, costs
to advertise the sale, etc.) and which costs comprise the
largest portion of the total costs of foreclosure and
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realization on the collateral pledged after a default? What
percentage of the costs accrue (a) from the date of the
default until the filing of the complaint, (b) from the filing
of the complaint until the judgment of foreclosure, and (c)
from the judgment of foreclosure until the foreclosure
sale?
(iii) What is the typical amount of time it takes for the
loss recovery process to occur, i.e., the median time period
between (a) the date of default and the date a complaint is
filed, (b) the filing of the complaint and the date the final
judgment is ordered, (c) the date of final judgment and the
date of the foreclosure sale, and (d) the date of the foreclo-
sure sale and the date of the resale of the property?
Data was also collected to answer the following questions:
(i) Did the Supreme Court decision, BFP v. Resolution
Trust Corporation,83 affect the number of third parties who
bid at foreclosure sales, the amount bid at foreclosure
sales, or the percentage of cases in which the lender sues
the borrower for a deficiency?
(ii) Were the special matters of the Illinois mortgage
foreclosure law being used and did their use lead to more
third party bidding and higher bids at the foreclosure
sales?
(iii) Did the type of property in foreclosure (i.e., personal
residence compared to an income-producing real estate
investment) affect how well or poorly the borrower was
able to protect her equity in the property?
B. Methodology
The first step in this empirical study involved obtaining a
list of all Illinois real estate foreclosures commenced in Cook
83. 511 U.S. 531 (1994).
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County Chancery Court in July 1993 and in July 1994.84 The
list included the names of the parties, the property index
number for the property in foreclosure, the amount of relief
claimed by the mortgagee, the address of the property, and
the date of the commencement of the foreclosure action. This
list showed 448 real estate foreclosures filed in July 1993 and
422 filed in July 1994.85
The second step involved reviewing the official court files of
the Cook County Chancery Court for each foreclosure case
identified in the list of foreclosures.86 The report of sale typi-
cally indicated the final judgment (including the accrued
interest, attorney fees, publication fees, selling fees, and other
costs owed to the plaintiff), the highest bidder, any deficiency
or surplus, the person selling the property (sheriff or selling
officer), the type of property, the date of the sale, and the
judgment amount.
84. Chicago Title Insurance Company (Chicago Title) provided this list from its
computer system which tracks every real estate foreclosure filing in Cook County,
Illinois.
85. The U.S. Supreme Court decided BFP in June, 1994. 511 U.S. 531 (1994).
Many wondered whether the case would lead to higher or lower bidding at foreclo-
sure sales and whether it would lead to fewer challenges of foreclosure sales as
fraudulent conveyances. See, e.g., Stark, supra note 28. Thus, the data collected for
this study relates to cases filed approximately one year before the BFP decision and
cases filed one month after the BFP decision, in order to run comparisons.
Twenty-two additional real estate foreclosures in the 1993 sample and 24 in the
1994 sample were excluded from the analysis because they were filed in Federal
District Court rather than in Cook County Chancery Court.
86. The files included documents such as the summons, complaint, amended
complaint, the answer, motions, the judgment, other court orders, the notices, and
the report of sale. Documents were missing, however, from a number of files,
requiring us to seek information by other means. For example, some files contained
the court order confirming the sale but were missing the report of sale. Thus, one
could learn from the court file that a judicial sale occurred and was confirmed, but
the file would not have information regarding the details of the judicial sale, such as
the date of the sale and the amount bid at the sale. In those cases one could ascer-
tain whether a selling officer was used through Chicago Title's computer database.
The database showed whether the deed from the foreclosure named either a selling
officer or the sheriff as the grantor.
In addition, sometimes the judgment document in the file would not indicate the
type of property in foreclosure (i.e., residential or commercial). When the judgment
did not contain this information, one could obtain the information through
Lexis/Nexis Research Software. Lexis received its information primarily from the
records of the Cook County Tax Assessor's Office, the County Treasurer's Office, and
the County Clerk's Office, and updates its records annually. After entering the
property index number into the "Illinois Assets Library," Lexis displayed information
regarding the property, including the type of land use.
When information sought could not be obtained, the case was excluded from the
study sample if the particular calculations on the sample concerned the unavailable
information.
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For the cases that did not reach the judicial sale stage, the
case file usually contained either a motion for dismissal by
the mortgagee and a court order dismissing the case or an
order to dismiss for want of prosecution. Other files reflected
a dismissal because the mortgagor exercised the right of
reinstatement or redemption. In some cases, the mortgagor
filed for bankruptcy, resulting in a stay and dismissal of the
case. In a number of cases, however, the court file did not
indicate why the case was dismissed, requiring further re-
search to ascertain the circumstances leading to the dismissal.
After examining all the court files, the third step involved
categorizing the cases into seven groups according to their
resolutions: (i) cases which went to judicial sale, (ii) cases
dismissed after the mortgagor exercised the right of reinstate-
ment, (iii) cases dismissed after the mortgagor exercised the
right of redemption, (iv) cases dismissed based on a bankrupt-
cy filing by or against the mortgagor, (v) cases dismissed with
no stated reason, (vi) cases dismissed for want of prosecution,
and (vii) cases in which the files only contained the foreclo-
sure complaint and no further information.
The fourth step involved using Chicago Title's Tract Index
(a computer database tracking every deed recorded with the
Recorder's Office of Cook County, Illinois) to obtain informa-
tion on the resale of properties originally sold by judicial sale.
After entering the property index number for a specific prop-
erty, the Tract Index database identifies any deed recorded
against the property and often notes the amount of the sale.87
The fifth step involved ascertaining the reason for the
dismissals when it was not indicated in the court files and
87. Illinois imposes a transfer tax of $1 per $1,000 of the purchase price for the
sale of real estate located in Illinois. See Real Estate Transfer Tax Law, 35 ILL. COMP.
STAT. 200/31-10 (West 1994). The transfer stamps purchased must be affixed to the
deed in order to record the deed. See id. 200/31-20. When Chicago Title's Tract Index
did not contain the sale price, the purchase price could be ascertained by counting
the number of State of Illinois transfer stamps on the deed and multiplying that
amount by $1,000. In addition, the Cook County Recorder's Office keeps computer
databases which identify the purchase prices of properties calculated in this manner.
When Chicago Title's Tract Index lacked information regarding a property we
checked either the Cook County Recorder's database (by identifying the property
under its property index number) or Lexis (which obtained its information from the
Cook County Recorder's Office). If, however, a sale of property was exempt from the
payment of transfer taxes (such as properties being sold by the Department of
Housing and Urban Development), then the sale amount could not be ascertained
from the deed and we were unable to obtain the resale price of these properties.
There were 64 exempt sales in the 1993 sample and 16 exempt sales in the 1994
sample.
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when the cases were dismissed for want of prosecution. These
cases fell into four categories: (i) the mortgagor refinanced the
mortgage (in which case the Tract Index database listed a
release of mortgage and a new mortgage), (ii) the mortgagor
sold the property herself (in which case the Tract Index noted
a deed to the purchaser), (iii) the mortgagor worked out a
settlement with the mortgagee (in which case the Tract Index
listed a modification of the mortgage), or (iv) the mortgagor
executed a deed in lieu of foreclosure (in which case the Tract
Index showed a deed of the property to the mortgagee or its
nominee).
The sixth step involved searching the Chicago Title's Tract
Index for personal judgments against an individual or entity
to ascertain if the mortgagee had sued the mortgagor for a
deficiency in any of the cases which went to judicial foreclo-
sure and resulted in a sale price which was less than the final
judgment amount.8 8
The seventh step involved looking at cases which were
dismissed or stayed due to a bankruptcy filing. This required
checking Chicago Title's Tract Index to determine if any deed
or other document had been recorded in the Cook County
Recorder's Office. It also involved checking the computer
records of the Bankruptcy Court of the Northern District of
Illinois to ascertain whether a Chapter 7, 11, or 13 bankrupt-
cy was filed and, if so, to determine the number of days after
the filing of the foreclosure complaint that the bankruptcy
action was filed.
The eighth step involved looking at the cases in which the
property was sold at a foreclosure sale to ascertain whether
the mortgagor filed for bankruptcy at any time either before
the filing of the foreclosure complaint, during the pendency of
the foreclosure case, or after the sale (up to one year after the
foreclosure sale). This was completed by checking Chicago
88. An in rem judgment against the mortgagor was not included as a true
deficiency action because it was a suit by the mortgagee against the mortgaged
property, not the other assets of the mortgagor.
In Illinois, there is a special right of redemption valid for thirty days after the
judicial sale in cases where the lender is the high bidder and the bid produces a
deficiency. See 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/15-1604 (West 1994). As a result, lenders must
protect themselves in such cases with an in rem judgment so that if the mortgagor
redeems by paying the bid amount, the lender can still recover against the property
for the deficiency amount.
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Title's Tract Index.89 A further search of the computer data-
bases kept by the Federal District Court for the Northern
District of Illinois ascertained not only whether the mortgagor
filed under Chapter 7, 11, or 13 of the Bankruptcy Code, but
also the timing of the bankruptcy filing relative to the filing
of the foreclosure complaint and the foreclosure sale. Finally,
to discover whether the foreclosure sales were challenged and
set aside as fraudulent conveyances, the bankruptcy court
files were pulled on all of the bankruptcy cases filed after the
foreclosure sale.
C. The Difference Between This Study and
Prior Foreclosure Studies
There are several important types of data collected in this
study. This study examined the foreclosure sale and resale of
the property, as did Steven Wechsler's excellent study of
foreclosures in Onondaga County, New York.9° In addition,
and equally important, this study determined the percentage
of all foreclosure cases filed that were dismissed before the
foreclosure sale. As previously mentioned, the percentage of
foreclosure cases that are dismissed and do not go to foreclo-
sure sale is important when assessing the fairness and effi-
ciency of the foreclosure process. When a borrower is able to
avoid a foreclosure sale, the borrower is able to protect her
equity in the property either by retaining ownership of the
property (through reinstating the loan in foreclosure or refi-
nancing the debt) or by selling the property and realizing the
equity in the property after paying off the debt. The ability of
the borrower to have a reasonable opportunity to protect her
equity in the mortgaged property is the key factor in
evaluating how fair the foreclosure process is to borrowers.
Other studies have been flawed because they did not consider
mortgagor actions which preempt the foreclosure sale. As
previously discussed, foreclosure laws were developed to
create a process by which a borrower's equitable right to
redeem the property would terminate, thereby providing the
lender with an opportunity to realize on the collateral pledged
89. Chicago Title's Tract Index includes bankruptcy filings.
90. See Wechsler, supra note 3.
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and minimize the losses incurred after a loan goes into
default. Foreclosure laws balance the competing interests of
the lender and borrower.
This study applies a more sophisticated analysis to the
assessment of whether the lender or third party bidder reaps
a profit or loss upon the resale of the property and the
amount of such profit or loss. It is not sufficient to compare
the amount bid (for a third party bidder) .or the final judg-
ment amount (for the lender) against the resale amount when
calculating the profit or loss upon resale of the foreclosed
property. One must also take into account the expenses in-
curred by the third party or lender in carrying the property
and reselling the property in order to calculate accurately any
resale profits or losses. Instead of attempting to contact the
lenders and third party bidders in each of the cases in this
study in which the property was sold at a foreclosure sale, we
collected data from various banks regarding the average costs
to carry and resell property on which they have foreclosed
(less any income that is generated from the property).
A simple comparison of the final judgment amount to the
resale price may indicate profits where profits do not in fact
exist. For example, in the introduction to Wechsler's study, he
refers to a case in which the lender resold the foreclosed
property for $8,000 more than the amount of the final judg-
ment due the lender, suggesting an $8,000 profit. An $8,000
profit would indicate a flawed foreclosure system in which
lenders reap profits at the expense of the borrower's equity in
his or her property.91 This author contacted numerous banks
to ascertain what the typical carrying and resale costs are on
the properties that they take over at foreclosure sales. These
costs can easily constitute 10% of the resale price92 and hence
any resale for less than 10% of the final judgment amount
would in fact be at a true loss rather than a profit. In Wechs-
ler's example, the true profit decreases after subtracting the
carrying and resale costs.
This study commenced after the U.S. Supreme Court deci-
sion in BFP v. Resolution Trust Corporation.93 In this case,
the Supreme Court held that the amount bid at a noncollusive
foreclosure sale conducted in accordance with state foreclosure
91. See Wechsler, supra note 3, at 851.
92. See infra Part III.C.
93. 511 US. 531 (1994).
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laws would be presumed conclusively to be for "reasonably
equivalent value" for purposes of section 548 of the Bankrupt-
cy Code, and therefore not subject to being set aside as a
fraudulent conveyance.94 The Court rejected the requirement
of a federal standard of fairness (such as requiring that the
amount bid exceed 70% of the fair market value of the proper-
ty) and instead entrusted state foreclosure laws to prevent the
bidding of a peppercorn for a valuable piece of property.95
While some argued that BFP would lead to lower bidding
because it would be more difficult to challenge the amount
bid, others argued that more third parties would bid, and they
would bid amounts more approximate to fair market value.96
Hence, this study has compared data from cases filed in July
1993 (more than one year prior to the decision) with data
from cases filed in July 1994 (one month after the decision).
The study compared the results in foreclosure sales prior to
the BFP decision with the results in foreclosure sales occur-
ring after the decision to determine whether the decision had
an effect on the type of bidder and the amount bid at foreclo-
sure sales.
This study also collected data to determine whether the
BFP decision affected the number of mortgagors who file a
bankruptcy proceeding (or have one filed against them) up to
a year after the foreclosure sale. The study compared the
degree to which the borrower or junior lender was able to set
aside the foreclosure sale as a fraudulent conveyance in cases
filed before and after the decision.
Finally, because this study focuses on Illinois case law and
because it was initiated after a major reform of the foreclo-
sure laws in Illinois, the study collected data to determine
which reform features have been utilized and the impact of
such utilization on the fairness and efficiency of the foreclo-
sure process.
94. Id. at 535.
95. See id. at 540.
96. See Stark, supra note 28, at 565-66, 574.
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III. AN ANALYSIS OF THE RESULTS
OF THE EMPIRICAL STUDY
A. An Assessment of the Foreclosure Process in Light
of the Data Collected in This Study
One of the most significant pieces of information gleaned
from the data collected in this study was that 64% of the
foreclosure cases filed in July 1993 and 73% of the foreclosure
cases filed in July 1994 were dismissed and did not result in
a foreclosure sale.97 Therefore, only a third or fewer of the
foreclosure cases filed ended in a foreclosure sale.9" So in
approximately two-thirds of the cases filed, borrowers were
able to protect their equity in the property and avoid the
foreclosure sale. 99
Another key piece of data involved the extent and the effect
of third party bids in a foreclosure sale. In most cases, the
only people present at the foreclosure sale are the lender, the
borrower, and the party conducting the foreclosure sale. Third
parties successfully bid in only 11.2% of the 1993 judicial
sales cases and only 9.6% of the 1994 judicial sales cases.'0 0
This inability to attract third party bidders appears to reflect
a failure in the foreclosure sale process because a lack of third
party bids allows the lender to bid below market value. But a
lack of third party bids does not mean that the borrower loses
equity. In about 90% of the cases, the value of the property
does not exceed the amount of the debt secured by the proper-
ty plus the typical costs to carry and resell the property. 1 '
Thus, the level of third party bidding is not as inadequate as
it appears, it is merely reflective of market realities. The fact
that when lenders successfully bid, they resold for a loss in
97. See infra app. A, I 3(a); infra app. B, figs. 3a, 3b; see also id., figs. 4-9.
98. See infra app. A, I 3(a).
99. See infra app. B, figs. 5-9 (detailing the various ways that borrowers can
avoid the foreclosure sale and protect their equity in the property).
100.. See infra app. A, 4(g); infra app. B, figs. 10, 11 (reporting the identities of
the successful bidders).
101. This is also a reflection of the fact that the borrower will almost always
exercise the right of reinstatement or redemption prior to the foreclosure sale if the
borrower has equity in the property.
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72% percent of the 1993 cases and resold for a loss in approxi-
mately 90% of the 1994 cases 10 2 supports the conclusion that
third parties bid less often at foreclosure sales because bid-
ding more than the debt amount would not be profitable in
many of the cases which go to foreclosure sale.
Another important factor in assessing the fairness of the
foreclosure process is the number of foreclosures in which
lenders bid less than the debt and less than the fair market
value of the property, and then sue the borrower for the
deficiency. In the vast majority of the judicial sales cases in
both samples, the lender bid the final judgment amount
exactly.'01 The amount bid was less than the final judgment
amount in only 24.2% of the 1993 cases and 27% of the 1994
cases. 10 4 Of the approximately 25% of the judicial sales cases
in which a deficiency occurred, the lender pursued the defi-
ciency in only 28.2% of such cases in the 1993 sample and
12.9% of such cases in the 1994 sample. 105 Typically when a
deficiency occurred, the mortgagor had less equity in the
property than in non-deficiency cases. 106 In addition, in the
1993 cases in which a deficiency occurred, the property still
typically resold for less than the amount bid than in cases
without a deficiency bid.0 7 These two facts suggest that in a
number of cases, the fair market value of the property did not
exceed the deficiency amount bid. However, in approximately
25% of the deficiency cases in both 1993 and 1994, when the
102. Only two of the nineteen 1994 foreclosure cases where the property resold
within one year resulted in a profitable resale.
103. The median bid price for both samples was 100% of the final judgment
amount. See infra app. A, I 4(a).
104. See infra app. A, I 4(i).
105. See infra app. A, I 4(o).
106. The ratio of the principal due on the date of default to the original amount
of the mortgage in all of the 1993 judicial sales cases was 96.97%; while the ratio for
1993 judicial sales cases with a deficiency bid was 97.33%. It is interesting to note
that according to one study, lenders forebear from foreclosing after a borrower's
default and allow longer delinquencies when there is a very high positive equity
level, but as the borrower's equity level drops, the lender is more likely to bring a
suit. See Thomas M. Springer & Neil G. Waller, A New Look at Forbearance,
MORTGAGE BANKING, Dec. 1995, at 81, 83. Based on this study, a similar pattern
seems to exist regarding deficiency suits; the lower equity level characteristic in
deficiency suits reflects the fact that the lender has taken a bigger loss, inducing her
to sue the borrower for the deficiency.
107. The ratio of the resale price to the amount bid was 102.49% in all 1993
judicial sales cases, see infra app. A, 4(c), and 93% in the 1993 judicial sales cases
with a deficiency bid. The ratio of the resale price to the amount bid, however, was
103.65% in all 1994 judicial sales cases, see infra app. A, I 4(c), and 112% in the
1994 judicial sales cases with a deficiency bid.
Foreclosures and a Proposal for Reform
lender pursued a deficiency action against the borrower, the
lender was able to resell the property for more than the
amount bid.'0 8
The main criticism of the foreclosure process is that the
lender obtains an unfair double recovery by bidding less than
the debt due to her, bringing a deficiency action against the
borrower, and then reselling the property within one year for
more than she bid. This occurred in only approximately 6% of
all the 1993 judicial sales cases and in approximately 7% of
all the 1994 judicial sales cases.'0 9 Expressed as a percentage
of all foreclosure cases filed, this inequity occurred in only
approximately 2% of the 1993 and 1994 cases in this study.
The infrequency of double recoveries may surprise critics of
the foreclosure process. Yet, it may still be appropriate to
lament a system which produces inequitable results, however
rare, and to strive for even fewer such cases. Hopefully, this
can be accomplished without creating greater costs to lenders,
who in turn may pass the costs on to all borrowers through
loan fees and higher interest rates. Part IV will explore the
possibility of further reducing inequitable outcomes without
increasing the costs of foreclosure.
The final major component in assessing the fairness of the
foreclosure process to borrowers is the extent to which lenders
and third party bidders bid less than the fair market value of
the property and then resell the property within one year
after the foreclosure sale. The first important point is that a
surprisingly large number of the properties sold at judicial
sale did not resell within one year after the foreclosure sale
(41.6% of the 1993 judicial sales cases and 59.1% of the 1994
sales cases)."0 Indeed, when the foreclosing lender was the
successful bidder at the judicial sale, the percentage of cases
that did not resell within one year after the judicial sale was
even higher."' Third party bidders did not resell the property
108. See infra app. A, I 4(e).
109. There were ten such cases in the 1993 sample and eight such cases in the
1994 sample. See infra app. A, 4(e).
110. See infra app. A, I 4(x).
111. The percentage of such cases in which resale did not occur was 72.5% in
1993 and 62.5% in 1994. See infra app. A, I 4(t). The conventional wisdom is that
lenders do not want to be in the real estate business. Thus, one wonders why the
lenders failed to resell so many of these properties. One possibility is that the loss
they would take if they resold the property quickly was so large that they elected to
hold onto the property and hope for better prices in the future. Another possible
explanation is that the lender had so many properties on the market that she was
SUMMER 19971 665
University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform [VOL. 30:4
within one year after purchase at a foreclosure sale in 50% of
the 1993 cases and in 73% of the 1994 cases.
112
Of the judicial sales cases where the properties did resell
within one year, the ratio of the resale price to the final
judgment amount was 81.99% for the 1993 cases and 82.47%
for the 1994 cases. 113 Hence, the median results reflect losses
upon a resale of the property of between approximately 17%
to 18%. By combining the profits and losses for resales by
both lenders and third parties and comparing them against
the total number of judicial sales cases, we found that profits
were made upon resale in 12.4% of the 1993 judicial sales
cases and 3.5% of the 1994 judicial sales cases;114 in 18.0% of
the 1993 judicial sales cases and 13.0% of the 1994 judicial
sales, the lender or third party incurred a loss upon resale;" 5
and in 41.6% of the 1993 and 59.1% of the 1994 judicial sales
cases, the property either did not resell within one year or the
amount of the profit or loss could not be ascertained. 6
To understand more clearly who is earning a profit or incur-
ring a loss upon resale of foreclosed property and the amounts
of such profits and losses, it is helpful to separate the results
between lenders and third party bidders at the foreclosure
sale. This analysis reveals that mortgagees usually incurred
a loss when they resold property, while third parties usually
earned a large profit upon resale.
The mortgagee resold the property within one year of the
foreclosure sale for a profit in eleven of the thirty-nine 1993
lender resale cases (28.3%), and the lender incurred a loss
71.8% of the time. 17 In three of these eleven 1993 cases in
which the lender resold the property for a "profit,""8 the profit
was less than 10% of the final judgment. As discussed in Part
unable to sell them all within one year. It is unlikely that these unsold properties
were appraised at a value in excess of the debt due and yet were not sold within one
year.
112. This fact may indicate that in a number of these cases, the third parties
were not in the business of buying and quickly reselling foreclosed property, but
were ordinary home purchasers.
113. These numbers are slightly lower than the ratio of resale price to final
judgment found in app. A, I 4(d) because the numbers in app. A, I 4(d) included
resales that occurred more than one year after the foreclosure sale.
114. See infra app. A, 9I 4(x).
115. See id.
116. See id.
117. See infra app. A, I 4(o).
118. As used herein, the "profit" is the amount by which the resale price exceeded
the final judgment amount.
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IV, the typical carrying and resale costs can equal 10% of the
final judgment amount. Thus, since the lender made a true
profit in only eight of the thirty-nine 1993 judicial sales cases
that resold within one year, the lender made a true profit
upon resale in only 20% of the resale cases. The median
amount of this profit was $12,437.35, and the median amount
of the 1993 loss was $21,348.38. To give context to the median
profit and loss figures, it should be noted that the median size
of the mortgage loans, or the initial principal amount of the
loan, was $48,600 in 1993 and $49,506 in 1994, and the medi-
an final judgment amount was $62,646.77 in 1993 and
$61,115.85 in 1994.119 In summary, the data from the 1993
cases reflects that lenders usually did not make a profit when
they were the successful bidder at the judicial sale and resold
the property within one year. Occasionally, however, lenders
were able to resell for a true profit and, in some instances, for
a very large profit.
121
In the 1993 cases, when a third party was the successful
bidder at the foreclosure sale and resold the property approx-
imately one year after the foreclosure sale,'21 the third party
made a profit in nine of the twelve 1993 third party resale
cases, or 75% of such cases, for a median profit of $25,971.50.
The third party bidder resold for a loss in only one of the
twelve third party resale cases, or 8.3%, for a loss of
$12,750.122 The level of the profits in these cases, which is
calculated by comparing the ratio of the resale price to the
bid amount, was very high (ranging from 32% to 326%), with
five of the nine cases generating a profit of greater than
100%. While third parties rarely were the successful bidders
at the foreclosure sales in the 1993 cases, 123 when they were
119. These figures are based on the median of the judicial sales cases, not the
median of all foreclosure cases filed.
120. Of the eight cases where the lender resold the property for a true profit, the
lender made a profit of more than 100% in one case, a profit of approximately 50%
in another case and a profit of 37% in a third case. The other profits were just
slightly more than 10% greater than the final judgment amount.
121. Two of the cases included in this calculation resold after one year had
passed. In one case, the property sold two days beyond the one year period. In the
other case, the property sold 76 days after the one year period. These two cases are
included because they are close to the one year cut-off point and the number of
,resales within the precise one year period is small.
122. In two of the 1993 third party resale cases, the amount of the resale price
was not available.
123. Only 11.2% of successful bidders in the 1993 sample were third parties. See
infra app. A, I 4(g).
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successful, and resold the properties within one year, they
frequently resold the properties for very large profits.
In the 1994 judicial sales cases, only five third parties
purchased and then resold the property approximately one
year after the sale. Unfortunately, the profit or loss upon
resale in these five cases could not be ascertained.'24 With
respect to resales by lenders in the 1994 judicial sales cases,
the lender made a profit on four of the nineteen properties
which were resold by the lender within one year of the foreclo-
sure sale. In two of these cases the lender made a profit of
more than 10% above the final judgment amount, and in the
other two cases, the profit was less than 10% above the final
judgment amount. Thus, of the nineteen cases in which the
lender resold the property within one year of the foreclosure
sale, the lender made a true profit in only two cases, or 10%
of the resales. In one of these two cases the lender made a
profit of 379%, and in the other case the lender made a profit
of 98%. Thus, while lenders rarely made any true profit upon
resale in the 1994 cases, in two relatively rare occurrences the
lender reaped a huge profit upon resale.
To summarize the key data regarding the fairness of the
foreclosure process in protecting the borrower's equity in the
property: (i) in approximately two-thirds of the cases, the
borrower was able to avoid the foreclosure sale and protect his
or her equity in the property, (ii) in the vast majority of those
cases where the property was sold at foreclosure sale, the
lender was the successful bidder and resold the property for a
loss, but (iii) occasionally, third parties and very few lenders
purchased and resold the property for huge profits and (iv) in
a very small percentage of the cases, the borrower was sued
on a deficiency even when the property resold for a profit.
In short, the data reflects that the foreclosure system typi-
cally operates in a manner that protects the borrower's equity
in the property. In a very small percentage of the cases,
however, the system operates in an unconscionable manner.
Conventional wisdom holds that any reforms making the
foreclosure sale more commercially reasonable will add to the
costs of the process.'25 Since unconscionable results are rare,
124. One case was exempt from the payment of transfer taxes, one deed was not
recorded, and in three cases the records were not complete enough to allow a
comparison of the bid to the resale price.
125. See Alex M. Johnson, Jr., Critiquing the Foreclosure Process: An Economic
Approach Based on the Paradigmatic Norms of Bankruptcy, 79 VA. L. REV. 959,
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and since on average lenders are reselling the foreclosed
property for less than the final judgment amount, it does not
seem sensible to require cost-laden reforms. 2 ' Part IV ad-
dresses whether there is a method to make forclosure sales
more commercially reasonable without increasing the overall
costs.
This study also gathered some basic data relating to the
amount of time and costs of the foreclosure process. 127 The
lender waited approximately six months after the monetary
default to file the foreclosure complaint. 28 After the complaint
was filed, approximately four months elapsed between the
filing of the complaint and the judgment of foreclosure.129 An
additional four to five months passed between the judgment
date and the judicial sale. 3 ° The median time period between
the occurrence of the default and the judicial sale was approx-
imately fifteen months, and the median time period between
the filing of the complaint and the judicial sale was approxi-
mately nine months.' 3 '
The total costs of the foreclosure process consisted of
accrued interest, advances, costs of the lawsuit, attorney's
fees, publication fees and the fee of the sheriff or selling
officer from the filing of the complaint through the foreclosure
sale. These costs amounted to 19.61% of the final judgment
amount in the 1993 sales cases and 18.43% of the final
judgment amount in the 1994 sales cases. 32 The two largest
991-1000 (1993); James Geoffrey Durham, In Defense of Strict Foreclosure: A Legal
and Economic Analysis of Mortgage Foreclosure, 36 S.C. L. REV. 461, 504-08 (1985).
126. Johnson, supra note 125, and Durham, supra note 125, each argue, from an
economic perspective that focuses on creating an efficient foreclosure process, that
the more costly commercially reasonable sale process should not be required. They
both argue that such reform would not only harm lenders but also would harm
"healthy" borrowers (those who would borrow and not default), because the reforms
would cause higher interest rates or loan fees overall due to the more costly foreclo-
sure process. In addition, they each argue that these defaulting borrowers are
seeking more rights ex post than they bargained and paid for ex ante. See Johnson,
supra note 125, at 962; Durham, supra note 125, at 496.
127. The median time periods and costs for both the 1993 and 1994 samples were
very close and, therefore, both are reflected in the figures which follow.
128. See infra app. B, fig. 15 (comparing the time periods of the foreclosure




132. See infra app. B, figs. 12, 14 (depicting these costs as a percentage of all
costs and as a dollar amount). One can also determine the total costs to the lender
from the default by comparing the final judgment amount (the total amount due to
the lender) to the "principal amount." As used herein, the "principal amount" is the
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components of such costs were accrued interest on the amount
due and advances made by the lender for the protection of the
property.'33 Of the approximately 19% of the final judgment
amount which represents the costs to foreclose, over 7% of
such costs accrued during the period from the judgment until
the judicial sale.3 4 This is especially significant when one
considers the other data from this study, which reflects that
in the majority of the cases which go to judicial sale, the value
of the property does not in fact exceed the debt on the
property. 135
One of the more disappointing findings of this study was the
lack of use of the fifteen special features of the Illinois Mort-
gage Foreclosure Act. 136 In none of the foreclosure sales cases
did the borrower or lender make a motion to utilize any of the
special features geared towards attracting more third party
bidders. 13' The only special feature utilized was the use of a
selling officer, instead of the sheriff's office, to sell the proper-
ty.'38 This feature was not designed to attract more third
party bidding, but rather to reduce the costs and the time
period required to perform the sale. When the cases which
utilized the private selling officer feature were compared to
the other foreclosure sales cases, there were no differences in
results regarding the timing and costs of the foreclosure
process. The fact that the optional special features were not
used suggests that any reform of the foreclosure process
should not rely on optional features. It is likely that lenders
would prefer simply to take over the property as quickly and
cheaply as possible and then try to interest a third party in
amount of the loan still due and owing on the date of the complaint and does not
include any accrued interest, advances, attorney's fees, or any other fee which legally
may be added to the principal due. When comparing the median final judgment
amount to the median principal amount, one arrives at a total cost to the lender of
27.9% of the final judgment amount in the 1993 sample and 26.35% in the 1994
sample (these total costs include accrued interest, attorney's fees, advances, and
other fees from the date of default through the foreclosure sale).
133. See infra app. B, figs. 12, 14.
134. See infra app. B, figs. 13a, 13b. This percentage of costs is even lower than
the actual amount because, in calculating the final judgment, the lender's attorney
typically did not indicate attorney's fees after the judgment of foreclosure, and
instead put all such costs within the judgment amount.
135. This conclusion is derived from two facts: that on resale, the median result
is a loss rather than a profit, and that in only a small percent of the judicial sales
cases does the lender or third party resell the property within one year at a profit.
136. See discussion supra Part I.D.
137. See infra app. A, I 5(a).
138. See id.
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buying the property. The few borrowers who fail to protect
their equity in the property prior to the foreclosure sale are
probably unaware of their right to move for any special provi-
sions to apply to the foreclosure sale. It is also possible that
since lender's attorneys charge on average between $800-$850
to handle a foreclosure, 139 clients do not move for any special
matters since this would result in additional fees.
This study also collected data to determine the extent to
which BFP v. Resolution Trust Corporation4 ° affected third
party bidding at foreclosure sales and the amount bid at
foreclosure sales. Before BFP, 11.2% of the 1993 judicial sales
cases had a third party as the successful bidder, compared to
only 9.6% of the 1994 judicial sales cases after BFP.14 1 The
median amount bid for both the 1993 judicial sales cases and
the 1994 judicial sales cases was 100% of the final judg-
ment.'42 In addition, the ratio of resale price to amount bid at
the judicial sale, the 1993 and 1994 data was similar regard-
ing the ratio of resale price to final judgment, the percentage
of cases with a deficiency amount and higher resale price than
the judicial bid price, and the percentage of judicial sales with
a deficiency amount bid. 43 Thus the BFP decision appears not
to have had a material impact on the level of third party
bidding, the amount bid, or the degree to which lenders or
third parties make a low bid and then resell for a profit.
This study also collected data to determine whether the
BFP case affected the number of borrowers who would file (or
have filed against them) a bankruptcy action after the foreclo-
sure sale to challenge the sale as a fraudulent conveyance.
The data collected reflects that the borrower filed or had filed
139. See infra app. B, fig. 14.
140. 511 U.S. 531 (1994).
141. See infra app. A, 4(g).
142. See infra app. A, I 4(a).
143. See infra app. A, 4. The percentage of judicial sales cases in which a
surplus amount was bid differed significantly between the 1993 and 1994 cases.
While no lender in either sample bid a surplus amount, third parties bid a surplus
in 14 of the 18 (77.8%) 1993 third party resale cases and did so in only 4 of the 11
(36.4%) 1994 third party resale cases. However, the 1994 percentage figure may be
skewed by the fact that the base sample was much smaller in 1994 than in 1993,
especially since only one of the 18 bid prices was unavailable in the 1993 cases,
while 3 of the 11 bid prices were unavailable in the 1994 cases.
The percentage of deficiency cases where the lender sought a deficiency judgment
also differed between the 1993 and 1994 judicial sales cases. In 11 of 39 judicial
cases in 1993 with a deficiency (28.2%), the lender sought a deficiency judgment (in
4 of the 39 cases this information was not available). In 4 of the 31 judicial sales
cases in 1994 with a deficiency (12.9%), the lender sought a deficiency judgment.
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against her a bankruptcy action after the foreclosure sale in
only seven of the 1993 judicial sale cases and in only four of
the 1994 judicial sales cases. Further, in none of these seven
cases did the court files reflect that the borrower or a junior
lender challenged the foreclosure sale as a fraudulent
conveyance. 14 4 Although there were nearly twice as many
post-foreclosure bankruptcy filings among the 1993 sample
than among the 1994 sample, it would not be appropriate to
make a sweeping conclusion as to the impact of the BFP case
on bankruptcy filings based on a statistic encompassing such
a small number of cases. Both before and after the BFP case,
the percentage of cases in which a bankruptcy filing was
made after the foreclosure sale was very small. 145 Based on
this data, it may be safe to conclude that the BFP case may
have led to a small reduction in the number of bankruptcy
filings. This lower amount might be due to other factors as
well. The absence of challenges to foreclosure sales as fraudu-
lent conveyances in any of the 1993 and 1994 cases studied
may indicate that the bankruptcy filing was not motivated by
a desire to challenge the foreclosure sale as a fraudulent
conveyance.
B. Comparing the Results of This Study With the
Results in Prior Foreclosure Studies
Among the various empirical studies of foreclosures, 46 the
one closest in time and scope to this study was Steven Wechs-
ler's 1979/1980 study of foreclosures in Onondaga County,
New York.'47 According to Wechsler's data, mortgagees made
profits in half of the resales and suffered losses in the other
half, with total losses outweighing total gains and a median
loss on resale that was $1,800 greater than the median prof-
it. 148 In this study of foreclosures in Cook County, Illinois in
1993, mortgagees made a profit in approximately 28% of the
cases for a median profit of $12,437.35. Mortgagees incurred
144. See infra note 210.
145. Post-foreclosure bankruptcy filings occurred in approximately 4% of the 1993
judicial sales cases and in approximately 3% of the 1994 judicial sales cases. See
infra app. A, I 4(v).
146. See supra note 3.
147. See Wechsler, supra note 3.
148. See id. at 882.
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a loss on resale in approximately 72% of the 1993 cases for a
median loss of $21,348.38. Thus, in both studies, lenders lost
more money in the aggregate than they made upon resale. As
previously discussed, the losses lenders incur through the
foreclosure process may then be passed along to all borrowers
in the form of higher loan fees or interest rates.
According to the data collected by Wechsler, in fourteen of
the fifteen cases in Onondaga County in which a third party
resold the property, the third party did so at a profit, with
profits ranging from $7,000 to $23,000.19 In this study of
1993 foreclosures in Cook County, Illinois, third parties who
resold did so at a profit in nine of the twelve resale cases,
with a median profit of $25,971.50, and did so at a loss in one
of the twelve resale cases, with a loss of $12,750. Thus in both
studies, in the vast majority of cases, third parties who resold
did so at a large profit.
Another notable similarity between the results of two stud-
ies is that in both studies, the mortgagee was the successful
bidder at the sale in the vast majority of the cases. In
Wechsler's study, the mortgagee was the purchaser in three-
quarters of the foreclosure sales, 150 and in this study the
mortgagee was the successful bidder in more than 80% of the
cases.
151
These similarities in results reflect a pattern in judicial
foreclosure sales, indicating that the results of this study were
not an aberration. The results differed in some interesting
ways, 52 but these differences do not detract from the basic
similarities.
149. See id. at 883.
150. See id. at 875.
151. See infra app. A, I 4(g).
152. For example, the New York study noted a much higher number of deficiency
bids. See Wechsler, supra note 3, at 877. This difference is probably due to the
requirement to pay transfer taxes in a foreclosure sale in New York-which induces
lenders to bid less than the final judgment amount even if the lender does not intend
to sue the borrower for a deficiency-while there is no such requirement in Illinois.
See STATE-BY-STATE DIGEST, supra note 14, at 157, 405. The results in this study
differed in other ways with the results of the Wechsler study, supra note 3, and the
Aalberts & Bible empirical study of foreclosures in Louisiana, supra note 3. First,
only a very small number of deficiency judgments were sought in the New York and
Louisiana cases. Only one deficiency judgment was sought in the 94 New York cases
with a deficiency bid, see Wechsler, supra note 3, at 878, and a judgment was sought
in only 1.9% of the Louisiana foreclosure suits. See Aalberts & Bible, supra note 3,
at 220. This is small compared to the percentage of pursued deficiencies revealed in
the Illinois data-the lender pursued a deficiency action in 11 of the 39 deficiency
bids in the 1993 sample and 4 of the 31 deficiency bids in the 1994 sample. See infra
app. A, 4(o).
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It is illuminating to compare the results in this study with
the data collected in studies of Illinois foreclosures conducted
at different points throughout this century. The data from a
1933 study reflected that it took approximately two years to
complete a foreclosure sale, including a twelve month redemp-
tion period after the foreclosure sale,153 while foreclosures in
1993 and 1994 were typically completed in less than nine
months.15 4 Another significant difference involves the costs of
the foreclosure process. In the mortgage foreclosures exam-
ined in 1933, legal fees amounted to over 11% of the debt
due155 and the selling officer's fee as a percentage of each
mortgage debt was estimated at 6% of that debt.'56 In con-
trast, in the 1993 and 1994 cases, legal fees typically amount-
ed to only 1.5% of the final judgment amount and the selling
officer's fee was less than 0.5%.157 These changes may reflect
improvements in the foreclosure process since the Great
Depression.
The system also operates better today than it did in 1964
and 1974, as evidenced by the percentage of borrowers who
are able to prevent a foreclosure sale. As previously men-
tioned, prior to 1987, the statutory right of redemption in
Illinois activated after the foreclosure sale rather than be-
fore. 158 Foreclosure data from 1964 and 1974 reflected very
few situations where the borrower or a junior lender exercised
the statutory right of redemption after the foreclosure sale. In
1964, of the 1,343 foreclosure sales in Cook County, only
nineteen owners redeemed their property; 159 in 1974, of the
3,015 foreclosure sales in Cook County, only twenty-four
borrowers and four judgment creditors redeemed." 0 Similarly,
a study of redemptions in Iowa, where the statutory right of
redemption also runs after the judicial sale, reflected that
borrowers redeemed in only approximately 10% of the cases.
161
Conversely, the data from this study of foreclosures in 1993
and 1994 reflected a very large percentage of cases in which
153. See Carey et al., supra note 3, at 599.
154. See infra app. B, fig. 15.
155. See Carey et al., supra note 3, at 602, 623.
156. See id. at 607.
157. See infra app. B, fig. 12.
158. See supra note 77 and accompanying text.
159. See Jim Blanco & David Crumbaugh, Note, Foreclosures, Redemptions, and
Homeowners, 1975 U. ILL. L.F. 335, 351.
160. See id. at 351-52.
161. See Bauer, Statutory Redemption Reconsidered, supra note 3, at 350-51.
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the borrower utilized the time period afforded by the statutory
right of redemption prior to the sale to prevent a foreclosure
of the property. In light of this data, one may conclude that
the decision in Illinois in 1987 to have the statutory redemp-
tion period run before the sale rather than after the sale was
a wise one.
C. Accounting for Carrying Costs and Resale Costs:
Calculating the Mortgagor's True Equity and
the Lender's True Profits or Losses Upon Resale
One way to evaluate the fairness of a foreclosure process is
to examine whether the resale amounts within one year after
the foreclosure sale equal or exceed the mortgagor's equity in
the property. The mortgagor's true equity in the property is
not the difference between the fair market value of the prop-
erty and the outstanding balance of the loan on the date of
the foreclosure sale. Rather, it is the difference between the
fair market value and said outstanding balance plus the costs
the lender will incur in reselling the property. Without ac-
counting for these costs, one does not have an accurate picture
of whether a lender (or third party bidder) has made a profit
or loss upon resale of the property after the foreclosure sale.
The following costs typically arise when a lender takes over
property at a foreclosure sale and subsequently attempts to
resell the property: (i) broker's commission; (ii) real estate
taxes; (iii) property insurance; (iv) inspection and mainte-
nance; (v) attorney's fees to handle the resale; (vi) closing
costs for the resale; and (vii) the loss of interest on the final
judgment amount for the period from the foreclosure sale
until the resale. This study does not attempt to calculate the
actual amounts of these costs for different properties; instead,
it attempts to provide a general sense of what these costs
might be in a "typical" foreclosure case.16 2 This topic is raised
162. In determining the "typical" case regarding the fair market value of the
property and the amount of time likely required to resell the property, it is helpful
to look at the statistics generated from this study regarding the median resale price
and the average time period before resale. The median resale price was $56,750 (in
the 1993 cases in this study, approximately one-quarter of the lenders resold within
six months and slightly more than one-half of the lenders resold within one year).
The low number of resales within these time frames was surprising in light of the
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in this Article not only because these costs have an impact on
any evaluation of fairness, but also because these costs are
relevant to this Article's proposed reform.
It appears that lenders typically hire a broker to advertise
and market the property, usually paying a commission of 6%
of the sales price. 63 Usually, the banks also pay (i) approxi-
mately $750 for property insurance for each property they
take over at foreclosure, (ii) $10 each month to inspect the
property and (iii) approximately $300 for maintenance of the
property prior to resale.'6 4 According to one source, it appears
that attorneys usually charge about $400 to handle a closing
and the other closing costs incurred by the seller (title insur-
ance, recording fees, and transfer stamps) typically amount to
approximately $600.165 Based upon a report issued by the
Cook County Clerk's office, the average annual real estate
taxes in 1995 for property located in Chicago, Illinois, with a
fair market value of $75,000, were $1,962.166
If we assume an average fair market value for foreclosed
property of $75,000167 and an average of six months to resell
the property,168 and further assume lost interest based on a
rate of eight percent per annum for the six month period, this
suggests a figure of approximately $10,500 in total carrying
and resale costs for a "typical" resale. This amount is 14% of
$75,000. Hence, an estimated 14% of the resale price is con-
sumed in resale and carrying costs. Some of the carrying and
resale costs are fixed, while others vary depending on the
amount of the resale price and other factors. Because some of
the costs are fixed, the percentage of transaction costs will
increase for properties which resell at lower amounts, as
opposed to properties which resell at much higher amounts.
data in the Wechsler study showing that approximately half of the lenders had
resold within six months and almost 80% had resold within one year. See Wechsler,
supra note 3, at 879. When lenders resell the property on which they foreclosed
through a voluntary public auction, they can typically complete the resale in
approximately two months.
163. Telephone Interview with Jim Schulte, Vice President, LaSalle Home Mort-
gage (July 3, 1996).
164. Id.
165. Telephone Interview with Lawrence Stark, attorney in private practice (July
31, 1996).
166. News Release from the Office of the Cook County Clerk (Aug. 6, 1996)
(reporting the average Chicago taxpayer's real estate tax bill in 1995).
167. This figure is somewhat higher than the median resale prices in this study.
168. This figure is lower than the data from this study, but closer to the average
time needed to complete a commercially reasonable public auction.
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This point could be addressed in any legislative proposal that
attempts to calculate these costs as a percentage of the sales
price.
IV. REFORMING THE FORECLOSURE PROCESS
A. Bifurcating the Foreclosure Process to Promote the
Interests of Lenders and Borrowers
The data collected in this study and in other studies"6 9
suggests that, overall, the judicial foreclosure process in
Illinois'7" works adequately to balance both the lender's inter-
est in an efficient loss recovery system and the borrower's
interest in protecting her equity in the property. In the vast
majority of cases, the borrower protects her equity in the
property either by reinstating the loan or by redeeming the
property prior to the foreclosure sale. When a property actual-
ly goes through a foreclosure sale, the median resale price of
the property is less than the final judgment amount (a loss
rather than a profit occurs upon resale), suggesting that the
borrower had no equity in the property. These two facts sug-
gest that, most of the time, the foreclosure process permits
the borrower to protect her equity in the property.
The data also reflects, however, that in a small percentage
of cases, lenders and third party scavengers are able to pur-
chase property at foreclosure sales well below its fair market
value and then resell the property soon after, reaping large
profits. 7 ' Furthermore, since the data reflects that in the vast
majority of cases where the property actually goes to foreclo-
sure sale, the borrower has no equity in the property to pro-
tect,172 the current system is inefficient because it requires
cost expenditures with no corresponding benefit to borrowers
or lenders.
169. See supra note 3.
170. Unlike a power of sale, the Illinois judicial foreclosure process requires court
intervention, and provides for a statutory redemption period before the foreclosure
sale rather than after the sale (with a mere 30-day redemption period after the sale
in limited circumstances). The judicial foreclosure process in Illinois is similar to the
judicial foreclosure processes in many other jurisdictions. See, e.g., STATE-BY-STATE
DIGEST, supra note 14, at 91 (Delaware), 108 (Florida), 167 (Indiana); see also supra
Part I.B, I.D.
171. See supra note 109 and accompanying text.
172. See supra Part III.A.
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As a means to retain that which works in the judicial fore-
closure system and to replace that which does not, this Article
recommends a bifurcated foreclosure system for residential
mortgages.
Under the proposed bifurcated foreclosure system, foreclo-
sures would be either judicial strict foreclosures or judicial
foreclosures with a required commercially reasonable sale of
the property. 174 After 1) the foreclosure is filed and the mort-
gagor is served, and 2) the expiration of a ninety day period to
reinstate the loan, the court will order an appraisal of the
value of the mortgaged property that must be completed
before the judgment of foreclosure (the borrower would have
a four-month period to redeem before the lender could obtain
the judgment of foreclosure). 175 If the appraisal reflects a
property value which is less than the amount of debt due on
the date of the judgment of foreclosure plus a percentage of
173. This proposal to reform the foreclosure process is limited to residential
mortgages for several reasons. First, the data in this study and in other studies
which support this proposal is based overwhelmingly on residential foreclosures
rather than commercial or agricultural ones. Second, the factors involved in a
commercial mortgage loan are more complicated than the factors involved in a
residential mortgage loan. Third, the borrower in a commercial mortgage loan is
usually more sophisticated than the borrower in a residential loan, and frequently
utilizes more protective bankruptcy provisions when faced with a foreclosure action.
174. Cf Durham, supra note 125, at 509; Johnson, supra note 125, at 963.
Durham recommends a bifurcated foreclosure process in which a strict foreclosure
would occur if the debt exceeded the appraised fair market value of the property, but
a judicial sale would occur if the value of the property exceeded the amount of the
debt. See Durham, supra note 125, at 509. The proposal in this Article is similar to
Durham's proposal, with two notable exceptions. First, under Durham's proposal, if
the property value exceeded the amount of the debt, there would be an ordinary
public foreclosure sale as opposed to the commercially reasonable sale proposed in
this Article. See Durham, supra note 125, at 509. Second, the proposal in this Article
requires that the value of the property exceed the amount of the debt by a specified
percentage that reflects the anticipated costs to carry and sell the property.
Johnson proposes that upon the commencement of a foreclosure proceeding, a
trustee should be appointed to decide if the mortgagor has any equity in the proper-
ty. See Johnson, supra note 125, at 963. If there is equity, then the foreclosure action
would be stayed and the trustee would have the duty to sell the property through the
same methods used in standard retail real estate. If there is no equity in the
property, however, Johnson proposes that the foreclosure proceed in the ordinary
fashion (i.e., not a strict foreclosure). See Johnson, supra note 125, at 963. This
Article combines the best features of both of these proposals.
175. According to the data in this study, it takes approximately four months from
the filing of the complaint to get a judgment. See infra app. B, fig. 15. Appraisals
typically can be performed in a few days. Even assuming that the appraisal compa-
nies are busy, one month is more than sufficient time to complete the appraisal and,
therefore, this requirement should not add to the time it takes to obtain a judgment
of foreclosure. One month is the period from the expiration of the right of reinstate-
ment until the expiration of the four-month redemption period.
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the judgment amount (representing the costs of sale) as set
forth in the statute,176 the property is deeded to the lender on
the date of the judgment of foreclosure. This is a judicial strict
foreclosure with no public sale. The statute would require the
passage of a four-month period from service of summons to
the mortgagor 177 before the judgment of foreclosure could
occur and would give no discretion to a court to postpone the
judgment date without agreement of the borrower and
lender. 178 The borrower would have a statutory right of rein-
statement which could be exercised within ninety days from
service to the borrower. There would be, however, no right of
redemption after the judgment of foreclosure.
179
If, however, the amount of the appraisal exceeds the judg-
ment amount by more than the specified percentage, then the
176. The percentage set forth in the statute would be based upon studies collect-
ing data on the median costs lenders incur to carry the property, the median time
period for carrying property until it can be sold in a commercially reasonable
manner, and the median costs of the sale of the property. This Article roughly
estimates this percentage at 14% based upon an assumed carrying time of six
months and an assumed median resale price of $75,000. See supra Part III.C. A more
sophisticated analysis should be performed for purposes of any specific legislative
enactment rather than the primitive analysis employed in this Article.
177. In Illinois, the median time period for the borrower to exercise the right of
redemption was approximately four months in the 1994 sample and nine months for
the- 1993 sample; the median time it took for the borrower to reinstate the loan for
both samples was approximately four months. While one might interpret the 1993
sample's nine-month figure as indicating a need for a redemption period longer than
four months, the 1994 data in fact reflects the adequacy of a four month period. In
addition, some borrowers who took nine months or more to redeem the property may
have been able to move more quickly but did not do so because the statutory
redemption period was seven months. Based on the data regarding the median time
period for borrowers to redeem the property in the 1993 sample, it appears that
lenders will frequently work with borrowers to redeem the property from foreclosure
even after the statutory redemption period has expired.
178. Practitioners in Connecticut have complained that completing the strict
foreclosure process takes too long, sometimes as long as 18 months. Telephone
Interview with Marc Friedman, Partner, Dechert, Price & Rhoads (Aug. 2, 1996). The
reason for the delay is that the expiration of the borrower's redemption period is not
a firm deadline. Connecticut law gives the court full discretion to set the redemption
deadline beyond a twenty day period after the judgment of foreclosure. See Metropol-
itan Life Ins. Co. v. Bassford, 120 Conn. 384 (1935).
179. The Vermont foreclosure statute provides for a six-month right of redemp-
tion after the judgment of strict foreclosure which may lead to delay. See VT. STAT.
ANN. tit. 12, § 4528 (1973). As previously discussed, see supra Part III, the data
reflects that borrowers take better advantage of a redemption right prior to the
foreclosure sale rather than after the sale, and the same may well hold true in a
strict foreclosure context (especially one which contains the safeguard of requiring
an appraisal reflecting insufficient equity in the property as in this proposal). The
Vermont statute does not require an appraisal prior to a strict foreclosure, see VT.
STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 4531 (Supp. 1996), and presumably for this reason, it provides
for a redemption period after the strict foreclosure.
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property must be sold in a manner which is commercially
reasonable and designed to produce a selling price close to the
fair market value of the property. The borrower would have
the same ninety day statutory right of reinstatement and
four-month redemption period. There would be no right of
redemption after the judgment of foreclosure.
Requiring an appraisal that reflects a value of the property
that is in excess of the judgment amount is intended to ensure
that the borrower has sufficient equity in the property before
the lender must undergo the more expensive and time-
consuming commercially reasonable sales process. For
example, if it becomes apparent that on average it costs a
lender 10% of the judgment amount to pay for both
performance of the commercially reasonable sale and the costs
incurred in carrying the property from the date of the
judgment of foreclosure until the time the property sells, then
unless the appraisal reflects a value of the property which
exceeds 10% of the judgment amount, the borrower does not
have any true equity in the property that would merit the
more costly process of a commercially reasonable sale. Prior to
reforming the foreclosure process, further data should be
gathered to determine the typical amount of these costs when
calculated as a percentage of the judgment amount. 80 That
figure should be utilized in the statute as the amount by
which the appraised value must exceed the judgment amount
to require the commercially reasonable sale as opposed to a
strict foreclosure.
Lenders would benefit from a reform which bifurcates the
foreclosure process since the more expensive and commercially
reasonable foreclosure process will only be required when an
appraisal reflects that the borrower has sufficient equity in
the property to merit such a process and the borrower has
failed to reinstate or redeem the loan prior to the judgment of
foreclosure. According to the data from this study, this should
only occur in a minority of the foreclosure cases filed. 8' When
the appraisal reflects that the borrower has no equity in the
property,' 2 the lender will be able to take title to the property
in a more cost-efficient manner.
While requiring an appraisal appears to increase the costs
of the foreclosure process, the data collected in this study
180. See supra Part III.C for a discussion of these carrying costs and resale costs.
181. See supra Part III.A.
182. The data from this study indicates that this should occur in the majority of
cases which go to foreclosure sale. See supra Part III.A.
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shows that the appraisal should actually operate in a manner
that reduces instead of adds costs. Apparently, the typical cost
of the appraisal is $200 to $300 and takes a few days." 3 If the
appraisal shows that the borrower has insufficient equity in
the property, the property will be deeded to the lender on the
date of the judgment of foreclosure, thereby reducing the time
involved by approximately five months and saving over 5% of
the judgment amount in costs. This figure is based upon (i)
saving approximately 4% in accrued interest and advances
that would otherwise accrue during the period from the judg-
ment until the sale and (ii) saving approximately 1% of the
judgment amount which would otherwise be expended in
connection with costs to perform the public sale. In addition,
allowing the lender to retake the property more quickly when
the borrower has no equity in the property may also prevent
some deterioration of the property that commonly occurs
during the foreclosure process.
Borrowers benefit from this bifurcated process because it
requires a commercially reasonable sale, and thus a bid price
closer to the fair market value of the property, when the
borrower has equity in the mortgaged property and is unable
to protect her equity by reinstating the loan or by paying off
the loan prior to the foreclosure sale. If the property is worth
$100,000 and the debt and sales costs total $90,000, the
borrower's true equity in the property is $10,000. Under the
proposed process, the property would sell at or very near its
market value of $100,000. Because of the commercially rea-
sonable sale, the debt would be satisfied and the borrower
would receive the net proceeds from the sale. 8 4 This means
that lenders and third parties will be less likely to reap large
profits in the occasional situation where the borrower has
183. Telephone interview with Ron and Sue Becker, Principals of Becker Associ-
ates (July 12 and 18, 1996). The appraisal cost depends on the uniqueness of the
house. If there are many unique features to the house then the appraisal cost could
increase to as much as $600. See id.
184. The statute should require both a process by which the borrower would be
notified that she is entitled to this surplus amount and a procedure to collect the
surplus. Currently in Illinois, when a surplus is bid, the person conducting the sale
must advise all parties to the proceeding. It is not clear whether a borrower who is
no longer a party to the proceeding will know about the surplus. Usually, the
mortgagee's attorney will include the borrower's name on the list of parties to the
proceeding supplied to the person conducting the sale. Telephone Interview with
Jeffrey Liss, 1981-87 Vice-Chair of the Illinois State Bar Association Real Estate
Law Section's Committee that drafted the 1987 amendments to the Illinois Mortgage
Foreclosure Act (July 1996).
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significant equity in the property but is unable to reinstate or
redeem the loan before the foreclosure sale. Furthermore,
since the costs to perform the appraisal are relatively
minor,185 an appraisal should not pose a barrier to the bor-
rower's ability to redeem the property prior to the judgment of
foreclosure or prior to the commercially reasonable sale, if
applicable.
This Article leaves open the issue of recovering a deficiency
under the bifurcated foreclosure process for residential loans,
mainly because the bifurcated process should on its own work
to protect the borrower's equity in the property, making an
anti-deficiency action unnecessary. However, some states
enact anti-deficiency legislation for other reasons, such as
preventing a double loss to the borrower when property values
decline generally. The accomplishment of these and other
goals are beyond the scope of this Article.
Two basic assumptions must be correct for this bifurcated
system to benefit both borrowers and lenders. The first as-
sumption is that a fair and accurate appraisal of the property
can be made. By having the court order the appraisal rather
than the lender's or borrower's counsel, and by requiring that
a licensed residential real estate appraiser follow specific
guidelines in preparing the appraisal, a fair and accurate
appraisal should result. Such guidelines include making the
appraisal a "blind" appraisal, where the appraiser is not given
a goal number and is instructed to appraise the fair market
value'86 of the property, instead if the value as affected by the
185. Appraisal costs are less than the combined typical current sales costs for the
selling officer and costs to advertise the sale.
186. Market value is defined as:
the highest price in terms of money which a property will bring in a competi-
tive and open market under all conditions requisite to a fair sale, the buyer and
seller, each selling prudently, knowledgeably and assuming the price is not
affected by undue stimulus. Implicit in this definition is the consummation of
a sale as of a specified date and the passing of title from seller to buyer under
conditions whereby: (1) buyer and seller are typically motivated; (2) both
parties are well informed or well advised, and each using what he considers his
own best interest; (3) a reasonable time is allowed for exposure in the open
market; (4) payment is made in cash or equivalent; (5) financing, if any, is on
terms generally available in the community at the specified date and typical for
the property type in its locale; (6) the price represents a normal consideration
for the property sold unaffected by special financing amounts and/or terms,
services, fees, costs, or credits incurred in the transaction.
FNMA-FHLMC, Attachment Form on Real Estate Appraisal Terminology (1975).
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foreclosure process.1 17 The accuracy of the appraisal will be
reduced, however, if the borrower does not allow the appraiser
to gain access to the interior of the house. Some sort of deter-
rent should be established to prevent borrowers from denying
appraisers access to the premises (such as allowing the ap-
praiser to presume that the interior is in poor condition) or,
the statute should provide for the sheriff's office to assist the
appraiser in gaining access to the inside of the house.
The second basic assumption upon which this proposal rests
is that general procedures can be established that would
provide sales to third parties at the fair market value of the
property. Thus, the lender would be paid in full at the sale
and would not incur any further costs through marketing and
selling the property after the foreclosure sale. The sale could
take two possible forms, with the lender having the right to
elect between the two. In one form, a broker would be hired to
market and advertise the sale in the conventional manner.
The buyer would have the opportunity to inspect the property,
receive a title commitment, and obtain financing to purchase
the property. This procedure would clearly lead to higher costs
than the current foreclosure sale process, but should also lead
to a sale price at fair market value, especially if the house is
vacant (i.e., if the statute requires the borrower to vacate
possession shortly after the judgment of foreclosure and to
clean up prior to an open house).
A second approach to providing for a commercially reason-
able sale would be to conduct a public auction of the property.
The auction would have to use procedures similar to those
successfully used by independent auction firms to produce
sale prices above, at, or close to the appraised fair market
value or list price. 8 There are a number of differences be-
tween typical foreclosure sales and foreclosure sales handled
by independent auction firms. First, independent auction
firms advertise and market a large group of homes together
and spend much more money on marketing and advertising,
187. Other potential guidelines include the Uniform Residential Appraisal Report
form required by FNMA-FHLMC, and the requirements for appraisals contained in
the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery and Enforcement Act of 1989, Pub. L.
No. 101-73, 103 Stat. 183 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.)
(FIRREA).
188. According to data on sales conducted for Resolution Trust Company by David
Kaufman & Company, the sale price of thirty homes averaged 85% of their appraised
value. Telephone Interview with David Kaufman, principal of David Kaufman &
Company (July 1996).
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around $700 to $1,000 per house.1 89 The firms strive to obtain
a critical mass of houses (at least twenty to fifty) from many
neighborhoods to maximize public interest and to get a large
attendance at the public sale. There is a thirty to forty-five
day period to show the house. Prospective buyers can inspect
both the property and a form real estate contract. The proper-
ty is sold "as is." The bidder must put down at least 1 to 2% of
the purchase price in order to bid and the successful bidder
has thirty days after the public sale to pay the remaining
portion of the price; if she fails to pay the balance she will
lose her deposit. Brokers are invited to participate in the
process and earn a fee if they attract a successful bidder. The
auctioneer is licensed (trained in the art of calling for bids),
and can stimulate the level of bidding. The independent
auction firm typically charges a commission of between 5 to
6% to market, advertise, show, and sell a group of twenty to
fifty homes. Similar standards could be developed and enacted
for the new foreclosure sale procedure to achieve a commer-
cially reasonable sale and yield higher bids.
Offering lenders a choice between at least two methods of
foreclosure sale (either a conventional broker sale or an inde-
pendent auction-style public sale) is desirable as a means of
stimulating competition among providers of this service, in
order to keep costs down and sales up. The reduced charge of
the sheriff's office shows the impact of the 1987 reforms
allowing competition. Furthermore, the Illinois experience
demonstrates that the commercially reasonable sales process
should be required by law, rather than by a measure for
which the lender or borrower may choose to petition. 190
One problem may still arise in obtaining a fair market bid
using either of these two commercially reasonable sales meth-
ods. If the borrower retains title and possession of the proper-
ty between the judgment of foreclosure and the sale, the
borrower may bar access to the premises and may commit acts
of waste on the property. Although this would be irrational
(since the commercially reasonable sale is a means to protect
the borrower's equity in the property and to reduce any defi-
ciency) it is conceivable that not all borrowers would view the
forced sale of their houses as a process with which they
should cooperate. For this reason, the borrower should be
189. See id.
190. See supra note 137 and accompanying text.
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required to vacate the house within 'a short period after the
judgment of foreclosure.
B. Comparing the Bifurcated Reform Proposal
to Other Reform Proposals
Lenders seeking reform of the foreclosure process typically
desire a non-judicial power of sale because it is often per-
formed more quickly and cheaply than a judicial foreclosure.
As previously discussed, those who wish to protect the inter-
ests of borrowers typically seek reforms which make the sale
more commercially reasonable.
While a power of sale can be structured to be quick and
cheap, taking only two to four months, the fact that this
process allows foreclosure on someone's home without court
enforcement of contract rights makes it appear unfair. The
potential for abuse is particularly high because a court is not
involved. 9' The power of sale process is unfair because the
burden of proof shifts to the borrower, who must bring a court
action to enjoin the sale and show that the lender is not
entitled to the power of sale.'92 Furthermore, there is no
reason to believe that a power of sale, which does not require
a commercially reasonable sale, will prevent occasions in
which the lender or a third party is able to resell the property
for a large profit. If it were possible to reduce the time and
costs involved in the process while still protecting the borrow-
er's equity in the property, this would be preferable to the
more draconian power of sale that would lead to inequitable
results in a small percentage of cases.
On the other hand, the data from this study suggests that
the borrower seldom has any real equity in property which
goes to foreclosure sale. In cases where the debtor has no real
equity in the property, it would be inefficient to require the
more expensive and time consuming commercially reasonable
191. It is interesting to note that the borrower did not raise a defense to the
foreclosure suit in any of the 1994 cases and raised a defense in only two of the 1993
cases examined in this empirical study. See infra app. A, I 5(e). In each of these
cases, the default was a monetary default rather than a non-monetary default.
192. Cf BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1172 (6th ed. 1990) (describing a contractual
right of the mortgagee to sell mortgaged property without a court order).
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sale process.193 In such cases, requiring a redemption period of
four months and a strict foreclosure with no right of redemp-
tion thereafter is fairer and more efficient than the typical
nine month process needed to perform a judicial foreclosure
sale. The savings which can be achieved by permitting a
shorter and less expensive strict foreclosure in those cases
will then permit the added expense of requiring a commercial-
ly reasonable sale in the less frequently occurring cases in
which the debtor has real equity in the property but is unable
to reinstate or redeem the loan.
CONCLUSION
This Article has followed the advice of Justice Holmes to
"look the facts in the face"194 in its assessment of how well or
how poorly the foreclosure system operates and in proposing
reforms. This empirical study has confirmed some assump-
tions and disproved others regarding the fairness and efficien-
cy of the judicial foreclosure sale process. The data from this
study reflects a foreclosure system that typically operates to
protect the borrower's equity in the property. According to
this study, the borrower is able to avoid the foreclosure sale
and protect her equity in the property in approximately two-
thirds of the foreclosure cases filed. In the vast majority of
foreclosure sales, the lender is the successful bidder and
resells the property for a loss. Occasionally third parties and
193. Theoretically, if a foreclosure sale is commercially reasonable, the lender will
always achieve the fair market value of the property through that process. In that
case, the lender could rely on the foreclosure sale, rather than subsequently being
forced to resell the house, in order to get the best price possible for the property.
Hence, the lender should always be willing to submit to a commercially reasonable
sale, whether or not the debtor has real equity in the property.
This argument relies too much on the unknown effects of the statutory creation
of a commercially reasonable sale process. If empirical data indicates that, under this
proposal, the commercially reasonable sale process indeed typically leads to sales at
prices equal to or better than those that lenders could achieve if unconfined by
statutory requirements, then lenders could elect to avail themselves of the commer-
cially reasonable sale process created by statute.
Competition leads to better results for the consumer of the service. See infra note
215 (discussing the drop in sheriff's fees to perform sales after the introduction of
private selling officers). For this reason, this Article recommends that statutory
provisions requiring that the foreclosure sale be conducted in a commercially
reasonable manner only apply when the debtor has real equity in the property.
194. Holmes, supra note 5, at xxxii.
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more rarely lenders purchase at the foreclosure sale and resell
the property for huge profits. Finally, in a very small percent-
age of the cases, the borrower is sued on a deficiency even
when the property resells for a profit.
The facts uncovered in this study reflect the possibility of
improving the foreclosure process. The conventional view is
that one cannot simultaneously pursue the goals of fairness
and efficiency by creating a foreclosure process that both
allows the borrower to protect his equity in the mortgaged
property and reduces the costs of the process to lenders and
non-defaulting borrowers. The data from this study reveals
that this conventional wisdom may be incorrect. It is possible
to devise a new foreclosure process that can simultaneously
achieve both goals.
Under the bifurcated foreclosure system proposed in this
Article, if the fair market value of the property does not
exceed the final judgment amount plus anticipated carrying
and resale costs, then the lender may elect a judicial strict
foreclosure in which the borrower has a ninety day period to
reinstate the loan and a four-month period to redeem the
property before the judgment of foreclosure and judicial de-
cree naming the lender as the new owner of the property (i.e.,
no public sale of the property occurs). If, however, an apprais-
al indicates that the fair market value of the property exceeds
the final judgment amount plus the anticipated carrying and
resale costs, then the lender must proceed under a judicial
foreclosure with a commercially reasonable sale of the proper-
ty. The savings reaped by lenders due to the shorter and less
costly strict foreclosure process'95 will more than offset the
additional expense of an appraisal which will only be ordered
after the ninety day reinstatement period expires. In addition,
those few borrowers who have true equity in the property but
are unable to reinstate the loan or redeem the property are
protected by a required commercially reasonable sale that
should produce a sale price at or close to the fair market
value of the property.
By creating a foreclosure process that will benefit lenders,
non-defaulting borrowers, and defaulting borrowers, this
proposal for reform represents the true hypothetical ex ante
bargain that borrowers and lenders make. The normative
195. According to the data collected in this study, such savings should equal
approximately 5% of the final judgment amount.
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basis for this proposal is founded on the premises that the
foreclosure process should operate in as efficient a manner as
possible, and that a defaulting borrower should have a realis-
tic opportunity to prevent a forfeiture of his or her equity in
the mortgaged property. Congress enacted a federal power of
sale process 1) for multifamily residential mortgages held by
the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD)'96
and 2) for one to four family residential mortgages held by
HUD'97 and was considering a federal power of sale process
for all mortgage loans held by a federal agency (which could
also affect commercial mortgages). 9 ' The power of sale pro-
cesses under these laws should reduce the costs of the foreclo-
sure process compared to a typical judicial foreclosure process
like that in Illinois, but this power of sale unnecessarily
sacrifices the goal of providing the borrower with a mean-
ingful opportunity to prevent a forfeiture of her equity and, by
requiring a foreclosure sale, even when the borrower has no
equity in the property, the process is inefficient as well. This
Article thus recommends that Congress and state legislatures
consider meeting the goal of reducing the costs of the foreclo-
sure process for residential mortgages through the proposed
bifurcated foreclosure process, since this reform should not
only achieve cost savings, but should also operate in a manner
that is fairer to borrowers who have defaulted in paying their
mortgage loans.
196. See Multifamily Mortgage Foreclosure Act of 1981, 12 U.S.C. § 3704 (1994).
197. See Single Family Mortgage Foreclosure Act of 1994, 12 U.S.C. §§ 3751, 3754
(1994).
198. See 142 CONG. REC. S2127 (daily ed. Mar. 14, 1996) (proposal by Sen. Bond).
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APPENDIX A
The following is a summary of key data generated in this
study of Cook County, Illinois:
1. General Characteristics of the Data Sample:9 9
a) Type of lenders:
See infra app. B, fig. 1.
b) Percent residential properties:
(93) 159/161, 98.8%
(94) 107/115, 93.0%200
c) Percent commercial properties:2"'
(93) 2/161, 1.2%
(94) 7/115, 5.2%
See also infra app. B, fig. 2.
2. Timing and Costs to Foreclose:
20 2
a) Timing:
See infra app. B, fig. 15, for a summary of the time
periods.
199. A reference to "(93)" denotes the median results from the sample of foreclo-
sures filed in the Chancery Court of Cook County, Illinois, in July 1993; a reference
to "(94)" denotes the median results from the sample of foreclosures filed in the
Chancery Court of Cook County, Illinois, in July 1994. With the exception of
statistics specially tabulated for the cases that were dismissed, the statistics were
run only on the judicial sales cases (hence a denominator of 161 for the 1993 cases
that went to judicial sale and a denominator of 115 for the 1994 cases that went to
judicial sale).
200. Of the 115 cases that went to sale in 1994, one was for the sale of vacant
land.
201. Included within the designation "commercial properties" are properties
combining an apartment and a store.
202. Uniform data could not be collected for each case. In some cases, the final
judgment, or the break down of the various costs, was not available because the
'report of sale" was missing from the chancery file. In other cases, the principal
amount or information regarding the accrued interest was not available because the
lender did not itemize the outstanding amount he was owed. Because uniform
information was not available for all cases reaching a judicial sale, the software used
to calculate the various statistics skipped over the cases that did not have the
required information and consequently did not consider these cases in the calcula-
tions.
Due to the variations in the available information for each case, negligible
variations exist in the summation of (i) the ratios of the various costs to the final
judgment, and of (ii) the cost ratios during the periods from complaint until judg-
ment and from judgment until judicial sale. Consequently, the totals of the various
costs and the principal amounts do not equal one hundred percent of the final
judgment. The calculated ratios or median amounts, however, are an accurate
reflection of the information that was available and collected for the cases.
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b) Costs:
See infra app. B, fig. 12, for the percent of costs
relative to final judgment;
See infra app. B, fig. 13a, for a comparison of costs
to final judgment (from default until judgment);
See infra app. B, fig. 13b, for a comparison of costs
to final judgment (from judgment until judicial
sale); and
See infra app. B, figs. 14, 14a, and 14b for a com-
parison of costs by dollars.
3. Data of the Cases in Which the Borrower Avoided a
Non-Consensual Foreclosure Sale:




See infra app. B, fig. 3-9.204








203. Some of these cases were dismissed because the mortgagor filed for bank-
ruptcy, staying the foreclosure proceeding. These cases were automatically stayed at
the time of data collection. Some automatic stays may have been lifted after data
collection was complete, and some cases may have subsequently proceeded to the
judicial sale. This study classifies these foreclosure cases as dismissed because they
were dismissed in fact, and because the borrower has the opportunity under bank-
ruptcy law to protect any equity he or she has in the mortgaged property.
204. In reviewing figures 5 and 6, one may wonder why the number of redemp-
tion cases does not include cases in the categories listed as "sold by defendant" or
'refinance," both of which are examples of a mortgagor's redemption right. These
cases are categorized separately because the court file lacked information indicating
the cases in which a defendant refinanced or sold the property. When the court file
did not reflect a foreclosure sale, this study investigated other sources to determine
that a refinance or sale had occurred.
205. Under the Illinois Mortgage Foreclosure Act, once the foreclosure action has
commenced, the mortgagor and mortgagee can agree to a "consent foreclosure,"
whereby the mortgagor expressly consents in writing to the entry of a judgment
without the right of reinstatement or redemption and the mortgagee consents and
agrees to waive the right to a deficiency judgment. See 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/15-
1601(c) (West 1994).
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4. Data Relating to Bidding at the Foreclosure Sale,
Deficiencies, and the Resale of the Property:
a) Ratio of bid amount to outstanding debt at the
date of the judicial sale:
(93) 100%
(94) 100%




c) Ratio of resale price206 to bid at the judicial sale:
(93) 102.49%
(94) 103.65%
d) Ratio of resale price to final judgment:
(93) 85.13%
(94) 83.98%
e) Percent of all judicial sales cases in which a defi-
ciency amount was bid and the property resold for
a higher price than the judicial bid:
(93) 10/161, 6.21%
(94) 8/115, 6.95%
f) Ratio of cases with deficiency amount and higher
resale price than the judicial bid price to all cases
with a deficiency amount bid:
(93) 10/39, 25.6%
(94) 8/31 25.8%
206. As previously mentioned, the data relating to resale prices could not be
calculated for those resales which were exempt from the payment of transfer taxes.
Loans insured by HUD and the Veteran's Administration comprised 64 of the 1993
judicial sales cases and 16 of the 1994 judicial sales cases. Thus, these exempt resale
cases, and any other resale cases in which we could not ascertain the level of profit
or loss upon resale, were excluded from the calculation of profits or losses upon
resale.
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lender 136/161 84.4% 102/115 88.7%
% third party 18/161 11.2% 11115 9.6%
% defendant 1/161 0.6% 0/115 0.0%
% subsequent
lienholder 6/161 3.7% 1/115 0.9%
See also infra app. B, figs. 10, 11.
h) Percent of sales confirmed:
(93) 161/161, 100%
(94) 115/115, 100%








k) Percent of deficiency amounts bid by third party:
(93) 3/39, 7.7%
(94) 3/31 9.7%
1) Percent of sales with surplus:
(93) 19/161, 11.8%209
(94) 5/115, 4.3%
m) Percent surpluses bid by foreclosing lender:
(93) 0/19, 0%
(94) 0/5, 0%
n) Percent surpluses bid by third party:
(93) 14/19, 73.7% (4/19 junior lienholder, 1/19
defendant)
(94) 4/5, 80.0% (1/5 junior lienholder)
o) Percent of deficiency bid cases where the lender
sought deficiency judgment within one year:
(93) 11/39, 28.2%
(94) 4/31, 12.9%
207. In 12 of the 161 sales in 1993, we could not ascertain the amount bid at the
judicial sale.
208. In 27 of the 115 sales in 1994, we could not ascertain the amount bid at the
judicial sale.
209. See supra note 207.
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p) Percent of all judicial sales cases where the lend-
er sought a deficiency judgment within one year:
(93) 11/161, 6.83%
(94) 4/115, 3.48%
q) Percent of judicially sold properties that were
resold (by the mortgagee, third party or junior
lienholder) within six months:
(93) 41/161, 25.5%
(94) 32/115, 27.8%
r) Percent of judicially sold properties that were
resold (by the mortgagee, third party or junior
lienholder) within one year:
(93) 94/161, 58.4%
(94) 42/115, 36.5%
s) Percent of cases where the foreclosing party




t) Percent of cases where the foreclosing party




u) Percent of borrowers in cases which went to fore-
closure sale who file or have filed against them a
bankruptcy prior to the foreclosure sale:
(93) 60/161, 37.27%
(94) 35/115, 30.43%
v) Percent of borrowers who file or have filed
against them a bankruptcy action after the fore-




w) Percent of borrowers who file or have filed
against them a bankruptcy action after the fore-
closure sale (up to one year after the foreclosure
sale) where the foreclosure sale is challenged as a
fraudulent conveyance:2 10
210. Although a review of the bankruptcy court files disclosed no claims that the
foreclosure sales were fraudulent conveyances, in one of the 1993 cases and in two
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(93) 0/67, 0%
(94) 0/39, 0%
See infra app. B, fig. 16, for additional informa-
tion on judicial sales cases where the mortgagor
filed a bankruptcy action prior to or within one
year of the judicial sale.
x) Percent of all judicial sales cases where the lend-
er made a profit upon a resale of the property
211
(i.e. the resale price exceeded the final judgment
amount) or a third party bidder made a profit




y) Percent of all judicial sales cases where the




z) Percent of all judicial sales cases where the prop-
erty did not resell within one year or the resale
price was not ascertainable:
(93) 67/161, 41.6%
(94) 68/115, 59.1%214
5. Data on Miscellaneous Matters:
a) Percent of cases that use special features other
than appointment of selling officer:
(93) 0/111, 0%
(94) 0/115, 0%




of the 1994 cases the files were being processed for delivery to a warehouse and
therefore were not available for review.
211. The percentages in subparagraph (x) are based upon resales that occurred
within one year of the foreclosure sale.
212. In the 1994 resale cases, there were eleven third party bidders. In six of
these cases the purchaser did not resell, in two of these cases the resales were
exempt from the payment of transfer taxes, and in three of these cases the informa-
tion needed to calculate profit or loss was unavailable.
213. See supra note 212.
214. The information was unavailable in five cases.
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c) Percent of cases sold by the sheriff:
(93) 56/161, 34.8%
(94) 38/115, 33.0%
d) Percent of cases that are monetary defaults:
(93) 161/161, 100%
(94) 115/115, 100%




f) Percent of strict foreclosures:
(93) 0/61, 0%
(94) 0/15, 0%
6. Comparisons of Results Utilizing a Specific Factor as
the Distinguishing Feature:
215
Commercial properties v. residential properties:
See infra app. A, fig. 17.
215. Data summarized here includes a comparison of the July 1993 foreclosures
with the July 1994 foreclosures, as do most of the graphs in appendix B. A compari-
son of cases in which a selling officer was appointed to cases in which the sheriff's
office was utilized illustrates that the costs of conducting the judicial sale were not
affected and that the amount of time required to conduct the sale did not differ. It
should be noted, however, that prior to 1987, the sheriff's office typically charged
$750 to conduct a foreclosure sale. The sheriff's office has since lowered its rate to
compete with the private companies who charge $250. Since the 1993 sample had
only two cases and the 1994 sample had no cases where the borrower raised a
defense, a comparison based on this feature could not be made.
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FIGURE 2
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FIGURE 3A
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FIGURE 4
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FIGURE 5
1993 DISMISSED CASES





















Filed by Sr. lienholder* 2
Total 287
Mortgagee's motion to dismiss based on mortgagor's exercise of the right of
redemption.
** Mortgagee refiled complaint for foreclosure several months later, reflecting an
earlier dismissal of the case.
Complaint for foreclosure was filed by Senior lienholder, reflecting a dismissal of
the foreclosure case by the junior lienholder.
Deed in Oeu
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FIGURE 8
DISMISSED CASES DUE TO BANKRUPTCY
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FIGURE 9A















1994 DISMISSED DUE TO BANKRUPTCY
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FIGURE 10A










1994 JUDICIAL SALE HIGH BIDDERS
Jr. ienholder N.A
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FIGURE 11
COMPARISON OF 1993 AND 1994 HIGH BIDDERS
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FIGURE 12
PERCENT OF COSTS RELATIVE TO FINAL JUDGEMENT*
Fu 2-J
Attorney Accrued Advances Cost of Selig Publication












































COMPARISON OF RATIO OF COSTS TO FINAL JUDGMENT










Advances Cost of Se" uigto
Sut offloor Fee
COSTS
Costs Judgment to Judicial Sale*
1993 1994
Attorney Fees 0.00% 0.00%
Accrued Interest 3.13% 2.99%
Advances 1.42% 0.97%
Cost of Suit 0.00% 0.00%
Selling officer 0.40% 0.40%
Publication Fee 0.59% 0.58%
Total 5.54% 4.94%
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FIGURE 13A
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FIGURE 14























* These amounts do not equal the summation of the amounts in Fig. 14a and Fig. 14b
because we did not have the same data for all the cases, thus resulting in minor
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FIGURE 14A
MEDIAN $ OF COSTS UP TO JUDGMENT












Median $ Costs Up to Judgment*
1993
Attorney Fees $ 850.00 $
Accrued Interest $ 4,861.61 $
Advances $ 1,299.86 $
Cost of Suit $ 994.25 $
FIGURE 14B
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FIGURE 15
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FIGURE 16
JUDICIAL SALES CASES
(DEFENDANT FILED BANKRUPTCY PRIOR TO JUDICIAL SALE OR
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FIGURE 17A









1994 COMMERCIAL PROPERTY CASES
Judicial Sale
30%
Dismissed
70%
1994
Judicial Sale 7
Dismissed 16
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